Taxation of Fractional Programs: Flying Over Uncharted Waters by Crowther, Philip E.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 67 | Issue 2 Article 3
2002
Taxation of Fractional Programs: Flying Over
Uncharted Waters
Philip E. Crowther
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Philip E. Crowther, Taxation of Fractional Programs: Flying Over Uncharted Waters, 67 J. Air L. & Com. 241 (2002)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol67/iss2/3
TAXATION OF FRACTIONAL PROGRAMS:
"FLYING OVER UNCHARTED WATERS"
PHILIP E. CROWTHER*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................................. 243
A. GENERAL DESIGN OF THE PROGRAM ............. 243
1. The Basic Agreements ........................ 243
2. General Principles ........................... 244
3. Operation of the Program ..................... 246
4. Economic Analysis of the Program ............. 249
5. Tax Analysis of the Program ................. 251
II. FEDERAL TRANSPORTATION TAX .............. 251
A. THE GENERAL RULES ........................... 251
1. The Transportation Tax ..................... 251
2. Taxation of Use of Own Aircraft .............. 256
3. Taxation of Joint Ownership Agreement ....... 261
4. Taxation of Dry Lease Exchange .............. 262
B. CHARACTERIZATION OF FRACTIONAL PROGRAMS.. 264
1. The Fractional Company Rulings ............. 264
2. Executive Jet Aviation ........................ 267
3. Critique ..................................... 270
C. CONSEQUENCES AND REMAINING ISSUES ......... 278
III. INCOME TAX ISSUES ............................. 279
A. THE GENERAL RULES ........................... 279
1. The Income Tax ............................. 279
* Attorney, Law Offices of Phil Crowther, a Kansas legal practice limited to
aviation business and tax law. From 1986 to 1999, he was the Tax Manager and
Assistant Treasurer at Cessna Aircraft. He graduated from Kansas State
University, B.S., 1972 and University of Kansas, J.D. and M.B.A., 1976. He is a
Certified Public Accountant, Kansas, 1979, and has worked for several CPA firms,
including a Big 6 firm. He was the corporate tax attorney for Koch Industries, a
large multinational company. He is a member of the N.B.A.A. Tax Committee,
has written several articles and is a frequent speaker on aircraft business and tax
matters, including fractional ownership. The author wishes to acknowledge the
assistance of Eileen M. Gleimer and Sherman Drew.
242 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [67
2. Taxation of Use of Own Aircraft .............. 279
3. Taxation of Joint Ownership Agreement ....... 282
4. Taxation of Dry Lease Exchange .............. 282
B. CHARACTERIZATION OF FRACTIONAL PROGRAMS.. 283
1. In General .................................. 283
2. The Depreciation Deduction ................... 283
C. CONSEQUENCES AND REMAINING ISSUES ......... 285
1. Tax Depreciation ............................ 285
2. Dry Lease Exchange .......................... 286
3. Administrative Issues ......................... 286
IV. STATE TAXATION OF FRACTIONAL
PRO GRAM S ........................................ 287
A. BACKGROUND ................................... 287
B. FEDERAL LIMITATION ON STATE TAx ............ 287
C. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS .................. 288
1. The Due Process Clause and the "Nexus"
Requirement ................................. 289
2. The Property Tax Cases and the "Situs"
Requirement ................................. 289
3. The Commerce Clause and the "Taxable
M om ent" ....... ............................ 293
4. Complete Auto Transit ....................... 295
5. Treatment of Resident and Nonresident
A ircraft ..................................... 297
6. Treatment of Leased Property Temporarily
Located in the State .......................... 298
V. STATE SALES AND USE TAX ..................... 300
A. THE GENERAL RULES ........................... 300
1. The Sales and Use Tax ...................... 300
2. Taxation of Purchase and Use or Own Aircraft
............................................ 3 0 4
3. Taxation of Joint Ownership Arrangements .... 305
4. Taxation of Dry Lease Exchange .............. 306
B. CHARACTERIZATION OF FRACTIONAL PROGRAMS.. 308
1. The New York Ruling ........................ 308
2. The Texas Pronouncement .................... 312
3. Critique ..................................... 313
C. CONSEQUENCES AND REMAINING ISSUES ......... 314
1. Tax on the Purchase and Use of the Fractional
Interest ...................................... 314
2. Tax on the Lease Payments ................... 314
3. No Safe Harbors? ............................ 315
VI. STATE PROPERTY/REGISTRATION TAX ........ 316
TAXATION OF FRACTIONAL PROGRAMS
A. THE GENERAL RULES ........................... 316
1. Property Tax ................................ 316
2. Aircraft Registration Tax ..................... 317
B. CHARACTERIZATION OF FRACTIONAL PROGRAMS.. 318
C. CONSEQUENCES AND REMAINING ISSUES ......... 318
1. Property Tax ................................ 318
2. Aircraft Registration Tax ..................... 319
VII. CONCLUSION ..................................... 319
I. INTRODUCTION
THE FRACTIONAL programs were designed to allow the
program aircraft to be operated under Part 91 of the Fed-
eral Aviation Regulations (the FARs). It was expected that the
participant in the fractional program (the "interest owner")
would be entitled to the same tax benefits as any other aircraft
owner operating under Part 91. For example, it was expected
that the use of the aircraft would not be subject to the federal
transportation tax and that the interest owner would be entitled
to claim a depreciation deduction for income tax purposes.
However, because of their novelty, fractional programs have
proven difficult to characterize for tax purposes.
In the early days of aviation, the tax characterization of air-
craft transactions was often resolved by considering the tax treat-
ment of other forms of transportation, such as ships.
Unfortunately, while there are programs with some similarities,
there does not appear to be anything that is equivalent to a frac-
tional program. We are flying over uncharted waters.
A. GENERAL DESIGN OF THE PROGRAM
1. The Basic Agreements
There are four basic agreements that are signed by each inter-
est owner:
1. An agreement with the selling company to purchase an
undivided interest in a particular aircraft and to resell
the aircraft back to the selling company for fair market
value at the end of a specified term (the "purchase
agreement").
2. An agreement with the other joint owners of the air-
craft to participate in the fractional program. (the
'joint ownership agreement").
3. An agreement with the other joint owners of the air-
craft to participate in an interchange of aircraft with
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the owners of other aircraft (the "interchange
agreement").
4. An agreement with the management company to main-
tain and schedule the aircraft, and to provide pilots to
the interest owner when the interest owner is using a
program aircraft (the "management agreement").
In many cases, the selling company and the management
company are the same legal entity. In other cases, they are re-
lated legal entities.
2. General Principles
a. Part 91 vs. Part 135
For Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) purposes, aircraft
are generally classified into three categories: private aircraft,
charter aircraft and airline aircraft. Private aircraft are typically
operated under Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (the
FARs), charter aircraft are typically operated under Part 135 and
airline aircraft are typically operated under Part 121. Our pri-
mary concern is with the distinction between Part 91 and Part
135. An aircraft owner would generally prefer to operate under
Part 91, since there are fewer requirements and limitations re-
garding the operation of the aircraft. However, a Part 91 opera-
tor also cannot transport others for compensation or hire.
b. Operational Control
With certain exceptions, in order to operate an aircraft under
Part 91, the user must accept responsibility for "operational con-
trol" of the aircraft.' This means that the user exercises full con-
trol over and bears full responsibility for the airworthiness and
operation of the aircraft. 2 This is more than a token responsibil-
ity. If there is an incident, the FAA and the civil courts can hold
the user responsible for the consequences.'
I "Operational control," as defined in 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2002), "with respect to a
flight, means the exercise of authority over initiating, conducting or terminating
a flight."
2 Regulation of Fractional Aircraft Ownership Programs and On-Demand Op-
erations, 66 Fed. Reg. 37520-21 (July 18, 2001) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts.
13, 61, 91, 119, 125, 135, and 142).
3 The FAA can hold the user liable for "careless and reckless" operation and
for other specific violations, depending on the nature of the incident. FAA Gen-
eral Operating & Flight Rules, 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2002). The civil courts can hold
the user liable for damages resulting from negligent maintenance and/or negli-
gent operation of the aircraft, depending on the nature of the incident.
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c. Joint Ownership Agreement
There are at least two kinds of joint ownership agreements.
One is an agreement between the joint owners of an aircraft
that specifies their rights and duties relative to the aircraft. Gen-
erally, in order to operate the aircraft under Part 91, each of the
joint owners must retain "operational control" of the aircraft
and obtain the pilots for their respective periods of use. An-
other kind of joint ownership agreement is described in 14
C.F.R. § 91.501 (FAR 91.501), which allows ajointly owned air-
craft to be operated under Part 91 where one of the joint owners
provides the pilots for the other joint owners.4
d. Dry Lease vs. Wet Lease
An aircraft can be acquired by purchase or lease. Where an
aircraft is acquired by lease, the FAA consequences will vary de-
pending on whether the lease is a "dry lease" or a "wet lease." A
"dry lease" is a lease of the aircraft without the flight crew, while
a "wet lease" is a lease of the aircraft with a flight crew.5 Under a
dry lease, the lessee will generally have operational control, with
the result that the aircraft can be operated by the lessee under
Part 91. Under a wet lease, the lessor will generally have opera-
tional control, with the result that the aircraft must be operated
under Part 135, unless an exception applies.
Because of the possibility for confusion, the FARs require
that, for leases of large civil aircraft, the lease agreement be in
writing and contain a "truth in leasing" statement which clearly
states whether the lessor or lessee has operational control of the
aircraft.6
e. Interchange Agreements
There are many kinds of interchange agreements. One kind
is an agreement between property owners to engage in a "dry
lease interchange" of their property.7 Aircraft acquired pursu-
4 14 C.F.R. § 91.501(b) (6), (c) (3) (2002).
5 See, e.g., Truth in Leasing, FAA Advisory Circular No. 91-37A (Jan. 16, 1978),
at para. 5.
6 14 C.F.R. § 91.23(a), (a) (2) (2002). A "large aircraft" is "an aircraft of more
than 12,500 pounds, maximum certificated takeoff weight." 14 C.F.R § 1 (2002).
7 Such exchanges are common in the trucking industry, the railroad industry
and the container industry. See, e.g., IRS Market Segment Specialization Program
(MSSP) "Trucking Industry" (An interchange is defined in the Glossary as "[t] he
transfer of equipment from one carrier to another."). See also Tech. Adv. Mem.
8241-010 and William Weiss v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1987-505 (1987) (discussing
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ant to such an interchange agreement could be operated under
Part 91 as long as the user assumes responsibility for operational
control of the aircraft. Another kind of interchange agreement
is described in FAR 91.501 which allows aircraft operators to en-
gage in a "wet lease interchange" of their aircraft on an hour for
hour basis.8 In either case, compliance with the truth in leasing
rules is required.9
f. Management Company
Many Part 91 owners and lessees hire a management company
to manage their aircraft and to provide pilots. This is allowed
under Part 91, as long as the owner or lessee retains operational
control of the aircraft.
In many cases, a Part 91 operator will use a management com-
pany that is also a charter company so that they can dry lease the
aircraft to the management company for use in their charter
business. In such cases, the management company will also as-
sume responsibility for scheduling the aircraft.
3. Operation of the Program
The characterization of fractional programs for FAA purposes
has been the source of some confusion. Part of this confusion is
created by the language of the fractional documents. The origi-
nal fractional documents were submitted to and approved by va-
rious FAA regional offices. Once those documents had been
approved, the fractional companies were understandably reluc-
tant to change the documents, even after it became obvious that
the documents might have been more artfully drafted. l
In practice, the interest owner does the following:
1. Acquires an undivided interest in a particular aircraft
from the selling company.
2. Enters into a joint ownership agreement with the other
joint owners of the aircraft.
the use of interchange agreements in the railroad industry) and Norfolk South-
ern Corp. v. Comm'r, 104 T.C. 417 (1995) (discussing the use of interchange
agreements in the intermodal container industry).
- 14 C.F.R. § 91.501 (b) (6), (c) (2) (2002).
9 14 C.F.R. § 91.23 (2002).
I0 See discussion of the FAA history in Eileen M. Gleimer, When Less Can Be
More: Fractional Ownership of Aircraft - The Wings of the Future, 64 J. AiR L. & COM.
979 (1999).
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3. Agrees to engage in a dry lease exchange of their air-
craft interest with other owners, which provides the in-
terest owner with access to a whole aircraft for a certain
number of hours.
4. Assumes responsibility for operational control of any
aircraft used by the interest owner.
5. Hires the management company to provide mainte-
nance on the aircraft owned by the interest owner, to
provide pilot services on the aircraft used by the inter-
est owner and to provide scheduling services for both.
6. Resells their aircraft interest to the selling company at
the end of a specified term for fair market value.
These same elements are incorporated in the proposed
FARs. 11
a. Joint Ownership Agreement
Because FAR 91.501 refers to a 'Joint ownership agreement"
in which one joint owner provides the flight crew for other joint
owners, some have been led to believe that a fractional 'joint
ownership agreement" contemplates the same thing. However,
a fractional joint ownership agreement is merely an agreement
between the joint owners of the aircraft and does not contem-
plate that any joint owner will provide the flight crew.1 2
Proposed 14 C.F.R. § 91.1001(b) (1) provides that:
A fractional ownership program or program means any system of aircraft
exchange involving two or more airworthy aircraft that consists of
all of the following elements:
(i) The provision for fractional ownership program management
services by a single fractional ownership program manager on be-
half of the fractional owners;
(ii) One or more fractional owners per program aircraft, with at
least one program aircraft having more than one owner;
(iii) Possession of at least a minimum fractional ownership interest
in one or more program aircraft by each fractional owner;
(iv) A dry-lease aircraft exchange arrangement among all of the
fractional owners; and
(v) Multi-year program agreements covering the fractional owner-
ship, fractional ownership program management services, and dry-
lease aircraft exchange aspects of the program.
66 Fed. Reg. 37,520, 37,540-41 (July 18, 2001) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 13,
61, 91, 119, 125, 135, and 142).
12 Gleimer, supra note 10, at 1000-01.
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b. Dry-Lease Exchange
The "dry-lease exchange" is the most unique aspect of the
fractional programs. Many fractional documents indicate that
the fractional program utilizes a "wet lease interchange" under
FAR 91.501. However, in operation, this is not the case.'" Al-
though the fractional programs do involve a lease of the aircraft
interest from one interest owner to another, they do not involve
a "wet lease" because the interest owner does not also provide
the pilots. 4 Furthermore, the fractional programs do not in-
volve an hour for hour interchange. 15 For these reasons, the
arrangement is now referred to as a "dry lease exchange."
c. Operational Control of Aircraft Used
In order to allow the aircraft to be operated under Part 91,
the fractional documents have always provided that, where the
fractional participant uses a program aircraft, the participant
has "operational control" of that aircraft. The proposed FARs
insure that the interest owner is fully aware of the consequences
of having operational control, by requiring the interest owner to
acknowledge that by accepting responsibility for operational
control of the aircraft, the owner: (i) has responsibility for com-
pliance with all Federal Aviation Regulations applicable to the
flight; (ii) "may be exposed to enforcement actions for any non-
compliance;" and (iii) "may be exposed to significant liability
risk in the event of a flight-related occurrence that causes per-
sonal injury or property damage."' 6
d. Management of Aircraft Owned and Used
The management company also serves a multiple purpose: to
insure that the aircraft owned by the interest owner is properly
maintained; to effectively insure that the aircraft leased from
other aircraft owners is property maintained and to provide pi-
lots; and to schedule the use of the aircraft.
13 Id.
14 Proposed 14 C.F.R. § 91.1001 (b) (2) defines a "dry-lease aircraft exchange"
as "without crew." 66 Fed. Reg. at 37,541 (July 18, 2001).
15 Most programs allow lower or higher value aircraft to be used and do not
require an hour for hour exchange. For example, where a lower value aircraft is
used, the participant is charged for less than an hour of use and where a higher
value aircraft is used, the participant is charged for more than an hour of use.
16 66 Fed. Reg. at 37,542 (July 18, 2001) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.1013).
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4. Economic Analysis of the Program
Assuming that fractional aircraft, can be operated under Part
91, the primary motivation for fractional programs is one of eco-
nomics. To understand the economics of a fractional program,
we will first consider the general economics of aircraft owner-
ship, and then consider the incremental impact of using a man-
agement company, of using a joint ownership arrangement and
of participating in a fractional program.
The costs of aircraft ownership are generally broken down
into the following categories:
1. Capital costs - the costs of purchasing the aircraft, in-
cluding interest costs, as well as the depreciation in
value of the aircraft.
2. Direct operating costs - the direct costs of a flight, such
as fuel, and landing and parking fees.17
3. Indirect operating costs - all the other costs of aircraft
ownership, including insurance, hangar rental, salaries
of flight crew and support staff, training costs, and air-
craft maintenance costs.
Aircraft utilization is generally measured in hours. Because
the capital costs and most of the indirect operating costs do not
vary with usage, the average hourly cost of usage can be reduced
by increasing usage. In rough numbers, a typical business air-
craft is used for about 400 hours per year.' 8 Although there are
cases where aircraft have been used for more than 800 hours
per year, this generally requires a great deal of scheduling and
maintenance expertise. One of the difficulties with increasing
17 14 C.F.R. § 91.501(d) lists the following kinds of "direct operating costs:"
(1) Fuel, oil, lubricants, and other additives.
(2) Travel expenses of the crew, including food, lodging, and
ground transportation.
(3) Hangar and tie-down costs away from the aircraft's base of
operation.
(4) Insurance obtained for the specific flight.
(5) Landing fees, airport taxes, and similar assessments.
(6) Customs, foreign permit, and similar fees directly related to
the flight.
(7) In flight food and beverages.
(8) Passenger ground transportation.
(9) Flight planning and weather contract services.
18 AL CONKLIN & BILL DE DECKER, AIRCRAFr ACQUISITION PLANNING 140 (1998)
("The average annual utilization for operators who are members of the National
Business Aviation Association (i.e. mostly corporate operators) is about 420 hours
per year per aircraft for jets and turboprops.").
2002] 249
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
utilization is that the hours associated with repositioning the air-
craft ("deadhead hours") will also increase at a greater rate.19
Eventually, a point is reached where the cost of the deadhead
flights exceed the savings associated with greater utilization.
With regard to personnel, the aircraft owner can hire pilots
and others with the expertise to insure that the aircraft is prop-
erly maintained and to schedule the use of the aircraft. Alterna-
tively, the owner can hire a management company to do these
same things. Where the management company is hired to in-
sure that the aircraft is properly maintained, the owner will gen-
erally pay a monthly management fee to the company. Where
the aircraft owner obtains the pilots from the management com-
pany, the owner will generally pay an hourly or monthly fee for
the use of the pilots. The owner can allow the management
company to use the aircraft for repositioning, maintenance and
training flights and, if the aircraft is so used, the owner can re-
imburse the management company for the direct operating
costs of those flights.
Where the owner does not need a "whole aircraft," the owner
can join with others to jointly purchase an aircraft. This has the
effect of reducing the capital costs for each participant. Each
owner will pay the direct operating costs associated with its use
of the aircraft and a proportionate share of the indirect operat-
ing costs. The joint owners can also hire a management com-
pany to manage the aircraft, to provide pilots and to schedule
the use of the aircraft between the joint owners. From an eco-
nomic standpoint, each joint owner should receive benefits that
are proportional to the contribution made. This can prove chal-
lenging because some joint owners may end up using the air-
craft more than others and because indirect operating costs may
vary based on usage and other factors. The aircraft must be
available to the users on a fair basis, which requires a mecha-
nism to handle holiday usage and periods where the aircraft is
parked away from the home base unused. A management com-
pany can sometimes help alleviate these problems by arranging
for an exchange of aircraft between customers.
A fractional program provides joint owners with a formal
mechanism for sharing their aircraft with other joint owners -
the "dry lease exchange." A single management company is uti-
19 See, e.g., id. For example, in the case of an aircraft which is used for either
250, 500, 750 or 1,000 hours, the number of deadhead hours is, respectively, 0,
20, 60 and 120.
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lized to manage the aircraft, to provide pilots and to schedule
the use of the aircraft. Each owner pays an hourly charge associ-
ated with its use of the aircraft and a monthly management fee.
The fractional program faces many of the same problems as
joint ownership, since the program must insure that each inter-
est owner receives benefits that are proportional to the contribu-
tion made. The availability issue is generally handled by
guaranteeing that an aircraft will be available within a certain
period.
From an economic standpoint, the primary advantage of a
fractional program is that aircraft utilization can be increased
significantly. Once a flight is completed, the aircraft does not
have to be flown deadhead back to the home base. Instead, the
aircraft is simply flown to where the next customer is located.
Because of this, fractional companies are typically able to utilize
an aircraft more efficiently, generally in excess of 1,000 hours
per year. These increased efficiencies help offset the increased
scheduling costs. The result is that the hourly cost of owning an
operating a fractional aircraft lies somewhere between the
hourly costs associated with owning a whole aircraft and the
hourly costs of flying charter.
5. Tax Analysis of the Program
In general, the tax analysis of fractional programs will pro-
ceed in the same manner as the economic analysis- by consider-
ing first the existing tax rules relating to the ownership and use
of an aircraft, to the use of a management company, to the use
of a joint ownership arrangement and to the use of a "dry lease
exchange." Next, we will consider how fractional programs are
characterized or should be characterized for the purpose of
each tax. Finally, we will consider the consequences of that
characterization and any remaining issues.
II. FEDERAL TRANSPORTATION TAX
A. THE GENERAL RULES
1. The Transportation Tax
The current version of the federal transportation tax is part of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, and is codified in 26 U.S.C.
§§ 4261 et seq. (I.R.C. §§ 4261 et seq.).
2002]
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a. A History of the Tax
The first federal transportation tax was enacted in 1917 to
help finance the war effort and applied to the transportation of
persons or property "by rail or water or by any form of mechani-
cal motor power. 2 1 The tax was repealed in 1921.21 In 1941,
with war again imminent, Congress enacted a tax on the trans-
portation of persons.22 This was followed in 1942 by a tax on the
transportation of property.23 This tax applied to transportation
"by rail, motor vehicle, water, or air" and was broad enough to
apply to the transportation of people by bus and of property by
household movers. 94 The tax on transportation of property was
repealed in 1958, leaving only the tax on transportation of per-
sons.25 In 1962, the tax was further limited to apply only to
transportation of persons by air.26
b. The Airport and Airways Revenue Act of 1970
In 1970 both the transportation and fuel taxes were exten-
sively revised as part of the Airport and Airway Revenue Act of
1970.27 These changes were made to convert the tax into a "user
fee" which would be used to fund development of the air trans-
portation system. 28 The tax on air transportation of property
was reenacted, and the exemptions for sales to federal, State and
local governments were removed. A head tax on international
travel was enacted to help compensate for the use of interna-
tional travel facilities.29
20 Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-50, 40 Stat. 300; Revenue Act of 1918,
Pub. L. No. 65-254, 40 Stat. 1057.
21 Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, 42 Stat. 227. It does not appear that
the tax was ever applied to air transportation.
22 Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3469 et seq., added by the Reve-
nue Act of 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-250, 55 Stat. 687. In the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, these were reenacted and renumbered as 26 U.S.C. §§ 4261 et seq.
23 Internal Revenue Code of 1939, §§ 3475 et seq., added by the Revenue Act of
1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 957. In the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
these were reenacted and renumbered as 26 U.S.C. §§ 4271 et seq.
24 Rev. Rul. 57-356, 1957-2 C.B. 758 (household goods).
25 Tax Rate Extension Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-475, 72 Stat. 259.
26 Tax Rate Extension Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-508, 76 Stat. 114.
27 Airport and Airway Development and Revenue Acts of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
258, 84 Stat. 219.
28 According to the Senate Report: "[T]he taxes on the transportation of per-
sons and property by air are now generally viewed as user charges properly appli-
cable in the case of all users." S. REP. No. 91-706, at 396 (1970), reprinted in 1970-
1 C.B. 386, 396.
29' I.R.C. § 4261(c) (West 1994).
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The transportation tax was to work in tandem with the fuel
tax. A flight was subject to either the transportation tax or the
fuel tax, but not both °.3  The revenues collected from both taxes
were to be deposited into the Airport and Airways Trust Fund.
c. Current Law
The transportation tax was further complicated in 1997 with
the addition of the domestic segment fee.31 Currently, the
transportation of persons by air is subject to the following taxes:
1. The 7.5% tax on the amount paid for taxable transpor-
tation (the "percentage tax").32
2. A $3 tax on the amount paid for each domestic seg-
ment (the "domestic segment tax").33
3. A $13.20 per person head tax on the amount paid for
taxable transportation that begins or ends in the
United States (the "head tax").34
There are certain exemptions. The transportation tax does
not apply to flights in an aircraft having a maximum certificated
takeoff weight of 6,000 pounds or less, except when the aircraft
is operated on an "established line. 35 The transportation tax
also does not apply where one member of an affiliated group
provides transportation to another member of the group. 6
d. "Possession, Command and Control"
In order to determine whether the use of an aircraft should
be considered a taxable transportation service, the IRS relies on
the "possession, command and control" test, which appears to
have been borrowed from maritime law.3 7 This test was first ar-
ticulated in the context of a lease, where the IRS stated that:
30 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 72-156, 1972-1 C.B. 331 ("[T]he objective of the Act is to
have one set of taxes (either the transportation taxes or the fuel taxes) and not
two sets apply to any one use of an aircraft.").
31 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 929.
32 I.R.C. § 4261(a) (West 2002).
33 I.R.C. § 4261(b)(1) (West 2002). This will be adjusted for inflation.
34 I.R.C. § 4261(c) (West 2002). The head tax was originally $12, but has been
increased for inflation.
35 I.R.C. § 4281 (West 2002).
36 I.R.C. § 4282(a) (West 2002).
37 See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 81 U. S. 607, 610 (1871) (referring to "com-
mand and possession, and control"). See also Rev. Rul. 74-170, 1974-1 C.B. 175
(distinguishing between a "bareboat" charter where "the charterer is in complete
possession, control, and command of the vessel" and a time charter or voyage
charter, where the ship owner retains these elements).
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Where the owner of a vehicle.., leases it to others for the trans-
portation of persons but retains possession, command, and con-
trol of the vehicle, he is furnishing a taxable transportation
service .... However, where the owner of the vehicle transfers
the complete possession, command, and control of his vehicle to
a lessee, either by a charter-party or by actual practice, the owner
is not engaging in a taxable transportation service but is merely
leasing his vehicle.3"
Under this test, where a lessor provides both the aircraft and
the flight crew, the transportation tax will generally apply since
the lessor will generally be viewed as having "possession, com-
mand and control" of the aircraft. 9 However, where the lessor
provides only the aircraft, the transportation tax will generally
not apply." In later rulings, the IRS adopted the FAA terminol-
ogy, holding that a "wet lease" (aircraft and flight crew) is taxa-
ble transportation, while a "dry lease" (aircraft only) is a
nontaxable rental.4' In recent rulings, the IRS has also referred
to the FAA concept of "operational control" for determining
who has "possession, command and control" of the aircraft.4 2
e. Commercial vs. Noncommercial Transportation
For tax purposes, a distinction is made between commercial
and noncommercial transportation. Although the term "com-
mercial" does not appear in the transportation tax law, the term
"noncommercial" appears in the fuel tax law.43 The term "non-
commercial transportation" is defined in the fuel tax law as "any
use of an aircraft, other than use in a business of transporting
persons or property for compensation or hire by air."44 Because
the transportation tax and the fuel tax were designed to work in
tandem, the resulting generalization is that the transportation
tax applies to commercial transportation while the fuel tax ap-
plies to noncommercial transportation.45
38 Rev. Rul. 60-311, 1960-2 C.B. 341, 342.
394 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 60-311, 1960-2 C.B. 341.
40 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 72-394, 1972-2 C.B. 576.
41 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-256, 1968-1 C.B. 489; Rev. Rul. 72-617, 1972-2 C.B. 580
(taxable wet lease); Tech. Adv. Mem. 81-31-051 (May 8, 1981) (nontaxable dry
lease); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-26-057 (April 5, 1988) (taxable wet lease).
42 Tech. Adv. Mems. 93-47-007 (Aug. 12, 1993) and 94-04-007 (Oct. 20, 1993).
43 I.R.C. § 4041(c) (2) (West 2002).
44 Id.
45 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 91-706 (1970), reprinted in 1970-1 C.B. 386, 397:
[i]t is necessary to determine on a flight-by-flight basis whether the
aircraft is being used in a business of transporting persons or prop-
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The tax definition of "noncommercial transportation" is fairly
consistent with the FAA definition of "commercial operator."46
Nevertheless, the IRS has ruled that a person's status as a com-
mercial operator for FAA purposes is not determinative for tax
purposes.47 Instead, the IRS has consistently used the "posses-
sion, command and control" test to distinguish between com-
mercial and noncommercial transportation.
f. Amount Paid
The transportation tax is imposed on the "amount paid" for
the taxable transportation. 4 The amount paid does not include
payments for non-transportation items.49 The amount paid is
not adjusted to reflect the fair market value of the transporta-
tion, even if the amount paid for the transportation is less than
the fair market value of that transportation.5 " For example,
where employees are entitled to free flights or to reduced-cost
flights, the IRS has ruled that the tax is based on the amount
actually paid by the employees.51
In some situations, the IRS has ruled that the amount paid
includes not only the cash paid to the person providing the
transportation, but the amounts paid to others. For example, in
Rev. Rul. 60-311, the IRS held that "where a company receiving
transportation service supplies the carrier with items which re-
present necessary elements of transportation (such as gas, oil,
lubricants, equipment, or insurance), such items are considered
erty for compensation or hire.... [I]f the aircraft is being used in
such a business (an example of which would include a passenger or
freight air charter flight), the taxes imposed by section 4261 and
4271 would be applicable and there would be no fuel tax imposed
by section 4041(c).
46 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2002) provides that, "'Commercial operator' means a per-
son who, for compensation or hire, engages in the carriage by aircraft in air com-
merce of persons or property, other than as an air carrier or foreign air carrier or
under the authority of Part 375 of this title."
47 Rev. Rul. 78-75, 1978-1 C.B. 340.
48 I.R.C. § 4261(a) (West 2002) (percentage tax); I.R.C. § 4261(b)(1) (West
2002) (segment tax); I.R.C. § 4261(c)(1) (West 2002) (foreign head tax). In
Rev. Rul. 72-245, 1972-1 C.B. 347, the IRS ruled that as long as there is any
"amount paid" for transportation, the entire foreign head tax can be collected.
Presumably, the same rule would apply to imposition of the segment tax.
49 See Treas. Reg. § 49.4261-8 (as amended in 1962); Rev. Rul. 57-545, 1957-2
C.B. 749; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-36-043 (June 6, 1986); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-21-053 (Feb.
19, 1987).
50 Rev. Rul. 72-245, 1972-1 C.B. 347; Rev. Rul. 70-381, 1970-2 C.B. 270; Rev.
Rul. 60-152, 1960-1 C.B. 547.
51 Rev. Rul. 72-245, 1972-1 C.B. 347.
2002] 255
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
to be payments for transportation. 5 2 In other situations, the
IRS has ruled that the amount paid also includes the value of
the use of the aircraft.53 For example, in Rev. Rul. 74-123, the
IRS ruled that where a transportation company provided taxable
transportation services using both their own aircraft and cus-
tomer-owned aircraft, the "amount paid" included the value of
the use of the customer aircraft.54 In Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-09-
009, the IRS ruled that employees should be taxed on the value
of aircraft used for personal transportation, even where no
amount was paid by the employee..5 5 This ruling was quickly re-
voked and replaced with Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-51-005, which reaf-
firmed that no taxable amount had been paid.56 To date, no
court has ruled on whether taxes can be imposed on payments
to third parties or on the value of the use of an aircraft.
2. Taxation of Use of Own Aircraft
As a general rule, the owner of an aircraft will not be taxed on
his own use of that aircraft, even where the owner hires a man-
agement company to maintain the aircraft and provide the pi-
lots. Nevertheless, in a few cases, the IRS has held that the
transportation tax applied because the owner relinquished pos-
session, command and control of the aircraft.
a. Rev. Rul. 58-215
In Rev. Rul. 58-215, the IRS ruled that an aircraft owner ("the
corporation") was not receiving transportation services from a
management company ("airline company") .5 This ruling pre-
dates the adoption of the "possession, command and control"
test. The owner purchased the aircraft from the management
company and entered into an agreement that appointed the
management company "to service, maintain, overhaul and oper-
ate the aircraft.' 51 As part of this agreement, the management
company provided the flight crew (a pilot and co-pilot), subject
to the approval of the owner. The flight crew was under the
52 Rev. Rul. 60-311, 1960-2 C.B. 341, 342.
53 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-123, 1974-1 C.B. 318 (value of use of own aircraft).
54 Id.
55 Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-09-009 (Nov. 21, 1985).
56 Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-51-005 (Sept. 10, 1986).
57 Rev. Rul. 58-215, 1958-1 C.B. 439.
58 Id. at 439.
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"exclusive control" of the owner, subject to the discretion of the
flight crew "as to safety of operation. 59
The owner reimbursed the management company for the
costs of maintaining and overhauling the aircraft and paid the
management company a fixed amount to cover the salaries of
the flight crew. With respect to each flight, the owner paid the
management company a specified amount per hour to cover the
direct costs of operation, including "gasoline, oil, and hydraulic
fluid. '6° The owner reimbursed the management company for
landing fees.
The owner purchased liability insurance on the aircraft listing
the management company as an additional named insured.
The management company indemnified the owner for any loss
or damages arising out of the hangaring, maintaining, servicing,
and overhauling of the aircraft. The management company also
maintained workmen's compensation and employees' liability
insurance on all its employees participating in, or in any way
connected with, the operation of the aircraft.
Although not discussed in the ruling, the owner presumably
paid the management company a fee for managing the aircraft
and providing other services, such as weather reporting services.
Based on the facts presented, the IRS concluded that the
management company was not providing transportation services
to the owner:
It is held that, since the corporation [1] owns the aircraft, [2] has
exclusive control over the aircraft's personnel, [3] pays the oper-
ating expenses of the aircraft, and [4] maintains liability and risk
insurance and [5] the airline operates the aircraft as an agent for
the corporation, the airline company is not, with respect to this
service, furnishing a transportation service for hire.6
b. Rev. Rul. 74-123
In Rev. Rul. 74-123, the IRS held that the owner of an aircraft
had relinquished possession, command and control of the air-
craft.6 2 This ruling is often cited as a case where the IRS con-
cluded that an aircraft management company was engaged in
providing taxable transportation services.6 " However, the state-
59 Id.
30 Id.
63 Id. at 440 (numbers in brackets added).
62 Rev. Rul. 74-123, 1974-1 C.B. 318.
(3 See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-04-007 (Oct. 20, 1993).
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ment of facts indicates that the aviation company was not hired
to provide management services, but was hired to provide do-
mestic air transportation services. The ruling states that, under
the contract, the company "provides domestic air transportation
for agency personnel on official business" and that the company
"is obligated to operate the aircraft on scheduled flights be-
tween definite points in the United States as provided in the
contract.6 4 The unusual aspect of the arrangement is that the
company used both its own aircraft and aircraft owned by the
federal agency to provide this service.
Otherwise, the arrangement was identical to any other charter
arrangement. The company was responsible for maintaining,
repairing, insuring and storing the aircraft. The company paid
all of the indirect and direct operating expenses, "except that
the agency furnishes at no cost to the company such spare parts
and built-up engines as may be required for such aircraft."65
The company hired the flight crew and other necessary person-
nel, all of whom were under the company's "exclusive control,
management and supervision."66 The agency paid the company
for the services at a specified rate that varied according to own-
ership and type of aircraft used and the number of crew mem-
bers required.
Under this set of facts, there was no doubt that the aviation
company was providing a transportation service to the govern-
ment agency. Transportation tax applied to amounts paid by
the government agency for the use of aircraft owned by the com-
pany. The question was whether the tax also applied where the
transportation was provided in aircraft owned by the govern-
ment agency. The IRS concluded that the tax should apply re-
gardless of whose aircraft were used:
The transportation service provided by the company when it op-
erates Government-owned planes is essentially the same service
provided by the company when it uses its own aircraft. Under
the circumstances of the case, the mere fact that the company
uses Government-owned aircraft rather than its own in carrying
out the contract is not sufficient to change the nature of the ser-
vice as "taxable transportation," for purposes of the tax imposed
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In computing the amount subject to tax, the IRS also con-
cluded that the same tax basis should be used:
In computing the transportation tax due on the part of the ser-
vice that involves use of Government-owned aircraft, the
"amounts paid" for the service include not only the amount of
money actually paid, but also the value of any contribution made
by the agency toward providing the service; for example, the
value of the use of Government-owned aircraft, insurance ex-
pense, etc. See Rev. Rul. 60-311, 1960-2 C.B. 341. However, in
lieu of computing the tax on the foregoing basis, the Internal
Revenue Service will accept a tax computed on the amount the
company would charge the agency for the particular service if a
comparable company-owned rather than Government-owned air-
craft were used.68
As can be seen, Rev. Rul. 74-123 does not stand for the pro-
position that a management company can be engaged in provid-
ing transportation services and that, in such a case, the owner
should be taxed on the value of the use of his own aircraft. In-
stead, the ruling stands for the proposition that where a com-
pany is hired to provide air transportation services, the tax
consequences will not vary simply because the company is using
aircraft provided by the customer.
c. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-43-002
In Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-43-002, the IRS extended the princi-
ples of Rev. Rul. 58-215 to cover an arrangement involving an
aircraft management company that was also a charter com-
pany.69 In this case, the aircraft owner ("B") entered into an
arrangement with a charter company ("A") providing that the
charter company would operate and maintain the aircraft ("X
aircraft") under its Air Taxi Certificate. The charter company
provided pilots and fuel, except that the owner would pay all
costs attributable to operating the aircraft for its use, including
"the salaries and standby charges for the pilots and all expenses
for fuel, insurance and overnight fees." The owner had the
right to replace any of the pilots and "to direct such pilots as to
when and where to fly subject to safety considerations. ' 70 The
charter company also provided insurance on the aircraft under
which the owner was the designated payee on all hull loss settle-
68 Id.
69 Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-43-002 (June 30, 1993).
70 Id.
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ment payments for the aircraft. The charter company had the
option to use the aircraft for charter to unrelated third parties,
as long as the charters did not infringe on the owner's right to
use the aircraft.
The IRS held simply that the arrangement was similar to that
in Rev. Rul. 58-215 and that the owner, like the owner in Rev.
Rul. 58-215, retained "possession, command and control" of the
aircraft. Consequently, the transportation tax did not apply to
owner flights for which amounts were paid to the charter
company.
d. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-47-007
In Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-47-007, the IRS considered an arrange-
ment involving a federal agency, similar to that described in Rev.
Rul. 74-123. 7' However, in this case, the IRS concluded that the
owner had retained "possession, command and control" of the
aircraft.
Under the contract with the federal agency ("FA"), the man-
agement company ("Corporation X) was required "to manage,
operate, and maintain government-furnished aircraft and gov-
ernment-owned air facilities in transporting personnel and
cargo of FA to and from locations specified by FA in the contract
and other locations which FA may from time to time specify. ' '72
The management company did not provide any of the aircraft
used.
Although the pilots and support personnel were employed by
the management company, the federal agency retained "sub-
stantial control" over the personnel. For example, key person-
nel were designated by name in the contract and the federal
agency "set forth in the contract detailed specifications as to job
qualifications and classifications, wage scales and benefits, labor
standards, and security clearances for such personnel and the
other employees." In addition, the federal agency established
"the flight destinations, schedules and routes" and often, "for
security and safety reasons," required the management company
to use specified aircraft.
The management company was compensated for these ser-
vices on an annual fixed-fee plus allowable costs basis. The man-
agement company had no risk of loss with respect to
71 Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-47-007 (Aug. 12, 1993).
72 Id.
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government property, except for willful misconduct or lack of
good faith.
The IRS held that the critical issue was whether the manage-
ment company was an agent of the federal agency or, as the con-
tract stated, an "independent contractor." The IRS concluded
that:
Although X is referred to in the contract as an independent con-
tractor, the totality of the contract provisions, particularly those
whereby FA pays the operational expenses, retains and exercises
substantial operational control, and assumes the risk of loss, indicate
that X is acting as an agent of FA. The contract is in the nature of
a management contract under which Xacts as an agent in operat-
ing and maintaining FA's aircraft with FA, the owner of the air-
craft, being the principal who has possession, command and
control of the aircraft.73
The major differences between this arrangement and that de-
scribed in Rev. Rul. 74-123 appear to be that, in this case: (1) the
agreement did not specifically require the management com-
pany to provide transportation services; (2) the management
company did not own any of the aircraft; and (3) the federal
agency appeared to play a more active role in the selection of
the pilots, the aircraft and the routes of flight.
3. Taxation of Joint Ownership Agreement
The IRS rulings relating to joint ownership agreements indi-
cate that the presence of such an agreement will not cause the
transportation tax to apply, even where the pilots are employed
by only one of the joint owners.
In Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-52-040 (and companion rulings), the IRS
considered a joint ownership arrangement where an aircraft
owner ("M") sold undivided interests in two aircraft to corpora-
tions in which it owned an interest ("N, 0, P, Q R, S, T, and
U').74 Following this sale, the aircraft was to be registered in the
names of each of the co-tenants (M through U). Each of the co-
tenants would pay a pro-rata share of the indirect and capital
costs, including "hangar rental, property taxes, insurance, debt
service, maintenance and depreciation."75  The co-tenants
would pay the direct operating costs, such as "fuel expenses,
landing fees, hangar rental when the aircraft are hangared away
73 Id.
74 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-52-040 (Sept. 30, 1980).
75 Id.
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from their home hangar, and pilot expenses" attributable to
their use of the aircraft.7 6 The flight crew would continue to be
employed by M who would enter into agreements to furnish
flight crew to each of the other co-tenants. However, any co-
tenant could terminate this agreement and engage its own pilots
to operate the aircraft. Pilots furnished to any co-tenant would
"be under that co-tenant's exclusive control, subject to the dis-
cretion of pilots as to safety."77 The co-tenants using M's pilots
would pay M a pro-rata share of the pilot salaries for each
month, based on their proportionate use of the pilots.
The IRS concluded that this arrangement was similar to the
aircraft management approved in Rev. Rul. 58-215. Regarding
the aircraft, the IRS noted that, "As owners of an undivided in-
terest in the aircraft, the co-tenants have equal rights to the pos-
session and use of the aircraft. The co-tenants will not rent or
lease the aircraft from the others; rather they will merely use
their own aircraft."78
Regarding the pilots, the IRS noted that, "As in Rev. Rul. 58-
215, M and its proposed co-tenants will fully control the air-
craft's pilots, subject to the pilot's discretion as to safety of the
aircraft. The co-tenants will be free at any time to discharge a
pilot furnished by M and engage a pilot of their choosing. ''v7
Accordingly, the IRS concluded that the transportation tax
did not apply to amount paid by the co-tenants. The IRS
reached the same conclusion in a later ruling involving two air-
craft and three co-owners.80
4. Taxation of Dry Lease Exchange
The use of a "dry lease exchange" should not cause the trans-
portation tax to apply. The IRS has ruled on a number of occa-
sions that the "wet lease" interchange of an aircraft is a
transportation service."1 Similarly, the IRS has ruled that the
transportation tax applies where the owner of an aircraft ex-





80 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-48-029 (Sept. 1, 1981). See also Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 81-48-030
(Sept. 1, 1981) and 81-48-032 (Sept. 1, 1981).
81 Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-02-004 (Sept. 6,1994), supplementing Tech. Adv. Mem.
94-41-005 (June 27, 1994); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-16-035 (Apr. 23, 1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
90-22-011 (June 1, 1990); Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-22-026 (Mar. 6, 1978).
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aircraft.8 2 In these cases, the IRS has held that the transaction is
similar to a barter exchange and that the amount subject to tax
should include the value of the use of the aircraft and crew. 3
However, where a "dry lease" is involved, the IRS has ruled
that the transportation tax does not apply.8 4
a. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6905161860A
In Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6905161860A, the IRS approved an arrange-
ment where a management company would occasionally trans-
port a customer in another customer's aircraft.8 5 Under the
management contract, the company agreed to operate the cus-
tomer's aircraft, to maintain and service the aircraft, to provide
the flight crew, to provide property and liability insurance, a
hangar and to arrange for dispatch and weather service. Each
customer had "exclusive control over the time and place of each
flight subject only to discretionary control by [the management
company] and the pilot on safety matters."8 6 From time to time
a customer would use an aircraft owned by another aircraft.
This would happen when the customer "has an immediate need
for a plane but does not have one of its own available." '87 Ac-
cording to the ruling, "This exchange of planes is on an infor-
mal basis, but requires the consent of the customer whose plane
is available."88 The customer using the aircraft would pay all of
the actual operating costs, but nothing was paid for the use of
the plane.
No question was raised regarding the customer's use of its
own aircraft since it was believed that the arrangement "is simi-
lar to that described in Revenue Ruling 58-215."9 Instead, the
question was whether transportation tax applied where the cus-
tomer used another customer's plane. The IRS concluded that,
82 Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-30-003 (Mar. 21, 1978).
83 See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-02-004 (Sept. 6, 1994) ("The arrangement be-
tween the taxpayer and the other corporation is essentially a barter exchange. In
this connection, amounts paid include not only cash, but also payments in
kind"). See also Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-14-005 (Jan. 14, 1994) (A barter agreement
to exchange products or services (e.g., legal or accounting services) for air trans-
portation is subject to transportation tax when the transportation is received).
84 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-256, 1968-1 C.B. 489; Tech. Adv. Mem. 81-31-051 (May
8, 1981).
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"Pursuant to the provisions of section 4261 of the Code, and
consistent with Revenue Ruling 58-215, we have concluded that,
under the circumstances stated, you are not, with respect to ei-
ther of the set of circumstances described, furnishing a transpor-
tation service for hire. 9 °
B. CHARACTERIZATION OF FRACTIONAL PROGRAMS
1. The Fractional Company Rulings
a. Tech. Adv. Mems. 93-14-002 and 94-04-006
In Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-14-002, the IRS reviewed one of the
fractional programs (presumably the Executive Jet Aviation pro-
gram) and concluded that the fractional owners had relin-
quished "possession, command and control" of the program
aircraft to the management company ("the taxpayer"). 9'
The IRS began by characterizing the taxpayer as a manage-
ment company and "an air charter service," presumably a refer-
ence to the "core fleet. '92 The IRS then discussed the basics of
the fractional program, noting that the management company
was responsible for managing and maintaining the aircraft and
for providing the flight crew.
The IRS considered both Rev. Rul. 58-215 and Rev. Rul. 74-
123 and recognized that, in both cases, the owner retained title
to his own aircraft. Instead, as in Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-47-007,
the IRS viewed the distinction as one of "agency," noting that
"the airline company in Rev. Rul. 58-215 was acting as the air-
craft owner's agent in the operation of the aircraft" while "in
Rev. Rul. 74-123, the aviation company was acting as a principal
in providing air transportation to the federal agency."
In Rev Rul. 58-215, "the owner had exclusive control of the
pilots, maintained insurance, and paid the operating expenses
of the aircraft." In Rev. Rul. 74-123, "The aviation company pro-
vided the aircraft crew and support personnel and was responsi-
ble under the contract for operations, maintenance, and
insurance expenses. The provision of the air transportation ser-
vice to the federal agency when agency-owned aircraft were used
90 Id.
9' Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-14-002 (Dec. 22, 1992).
92 Later in the ruling, the IRS noted that, "If there are no aircraft available
pursuant to the interchange agreement, under the management agreement, the
taxpayer provides, without compensation other than that provided for by the
management agreement, an aircraft from its charter fleet." Id.
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was essentially the same as when aviation company-owned air-
craft were used.
93
The IRS then concluded that, "In viewing the totality of the
circumstances, including the agreements and the respective re-
sponsibilities of the parties, although the owners are the title
holders to the aircraft, they have relinquished possession, com-
mand, and control, of their respective aircraft to the taxpayer
who provides air transportation.""
The IRS gave several reasons:
The owners are obligated upon the purchase of an interest in an
aircraft to sign agreements that effectively allow the taxpayer to
treat the A program aircraft as part of its charter fleet. The tax-
payer supplies and has command over the pilots and, even
though the owners may designate which pilots they prefer, the
taxpayer has ultimate control over assignment of crews. The tax-
payer is responsible for operations, maintenance, and insurance
expenses, and, depending on the nonavailability of the aircraft,
provides transportation to an owner in any aircraft in the A pro-
gram or within the taxpayer's charter operation - thus in many
instances transporting an owner in an aircraft in which it does
not even have an ownership interest. Under the owners agree-
ment, an owner generally cannot utilize an A program aircraft to
transport passengers or cargo for compensation or hire. There-
fore, the taxpayer is providing taxable air transportation of per-
sons under section 4261 (a) of the Code."
Having held that the situation was more like that in Rev. Rul.
74-123, the IRS also concluded that, "Additionally, as provided
in Rev. Rul. 74-123, in computing the transportation tax, the
'amount paid' to the taxpayer includes not only the money actu-
ally paid by the owners, but also the value of the use of the air-
craft provided by the owner."96
In Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-04-006, the IRS reaffirmed their posi-
tion and denied the taxpayer request that Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-
14-002 should be applied prospectively, disagreeing with tax-






97 Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-04-006 (Oct. 12, 1993).
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b. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-04-007
Although Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-04-007 does not involve a frac-
tional program, this ruling was issued at the same time as the
second fractional company ruling. In this ruling the IRS con-
cluded, apparently for the first time, that an aircraft owner had
effectively relinquished possession, command and control of its
aircraft to a management company ("the taxpayer").98 How-
ever, there are significant differences between this ruling and
other management company rulings.
The management company agreed to maintain the aircraft
and to arrange for pilots and other ancillary personnel. The
owners agreed to maintain insurance with respect to the aircraft.
In addition, the management company had "the "exclusive right
to rent, charter, and schedule the aircraft" and "full operational
control over the aircraft." The owner of the aircraft was entitled
to use its aircraft, "provided, however, that the aircraft has not
been scheduled for hire by the taxpayer."99 Owners Y and Z
paid a per hour flight charge when they used their own aircraft.
Under these circumstances, the IRS concluded that the own-
ers had relinquished "possession, command, and control" to the
management company. Although the contracts provided that
the taxpayer was an agent of the owner, the owners had given
the taxpayer "not only all rights to charter the aircraft but also
full operational control over the aircraft whether the air transpor-
tation is provided via charter to a third party or to an owner.'' °°
An owner was entitled to be transported in its own aircraft, "but
only if the aircraft has not been scheduled for hire by the tax-
payer."' 0 ' Despite their ownership of the aircraft, the IRS felt
that "those owners have yielded possession, command, and con-
trol of the respective aircraft by virtue of their relinquishing vir-
tually all decision making with regard to the operation and
maintenance of the aircraft, whether under charter or in regard
to the providing of air transportation to the owner. ' 12
A key factor in this ruling appears to be that, in contrast with
Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-43-002, the owner had relinquished the
right to use its own aircraft to the management company and
that the owner had relinquished "operational control" of the air-
98 Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-04-007 (Oct. 20, 1993).
9, Id. (emphasis added).
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craft to the management company. Taken together with Tech.
Adv. Mem. 93-47-007, this ruling seemed to indicate that the IRS
had finally come to recognize that "operational control" was a
critical factor to be considered in determining whether posses-
sion, command and control had been relinquished. However,
the fractional company rulings indicate otherwise.
2. Executive Jet Aviation
Following these rulings, Executive Jet Aviation ("EJA") de-
cided to take the matter to court. In accordance with the proce-
dures applicable to excise tax claims, EJA filed a claim for
refund of taxes paid on behalf of a particular customer, Texaco
Air Services, Inc. ("Texaco Air"). In Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v.
United States, an unpublished opinion, the Court of Claims de-
nied EJA's claim for refund, holding that the transportation tax
applied because EJA was engaged in the transportation busi-
ness.1"3 This decision was appealed.
In Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States, the Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the decision of the Court of Claims and held that
EJA was engaged in transportation business, and was not an air-
craft management company.10
4
The court began by considering EJA's argument that the
transportation tax did not apply because EJA did not have an
interest in the aircraft, either as an owner or a lessor:
EJA argues that, in order for Texaco Air's flights to have been
subject to the § 4261 transportation tax, EJA had to provide the
means for conveyance - either N111QS or another interchange
aircraft . ..
.... It contends that, on each of the flights at issue, Texaco Air
was either the owner of the aircraft on which it flew or the lessee
of the aircraft from the aircraft's owners through the in-
terchange agreement. Under these circumstances, EJA asserts,
its only role with respect to each of the flights was that of an
aircraft manager.' °5
The court held that this interpretation was not supported by
the language of the statute. To the contrary, the court held
that, "The critical statutory provision is I.R.C. § 4041 (c).
Through it, commercial aviation, which is subject to the § 4261
103 Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States, No. 95-7T (Fed. C1. Mar. 29,
1996).
104 Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 125 F.3d 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
105 Id. at 1467-68.
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transportation tax, is defined as 'any use of an aircraft . . . in a
business of transporting persons or property for compensation
or hire by air.'"10 6
Since the statute required only that EJA "use" the aircraft, the
court held that, "We reject EJA's argument that it was necessary
for it to provide aircraft to Texaco Air by being an owner or
lessor in order for Texaco Air's flights under the NetJets pro-
gram to be subject to the transportation tax."'0 7
Instead, the court moved on to the second part of the test:
What we must determine then is whether, based upon the cor-
rect reading of the statute, the Texaco Air flights that are at issue
involved "use of an aircraft ... in a business of transporting persons
or property for compensation or hire by air.... ." 26 U.S.C. § 4041 (c).
The central question is whether EJA was in the "business of transporting
persons or property for hire by air," for it is undisputed that neither
Texaco nor any of the other participants in the NetJets program
were in such a business. In our view, as far as the NetJets pro-
gram was concerned, EJA was in the "business of transporting
persons or property for hire by air." Consequently, the transpor-
tation tax was properly imposed.""s
In determining whether EJA was a transportation company,
the court acknowledged EJA's argument that they were merely a
management company:
As noted, EJA argues that its role with respect to each of the
flights was simply that of an aircraft manager for those who
owned or leased interests in aircraft. We disagree. The NetJets
program, which was administered and run by EJA, served parties
like Texaco Air who were interested in acquiring flight time, not an
ownership or a leasehold interest in a corporate aircraft. One could
become a NetJets participant by acquiring only a one-eighth in-
terest in an aircraft, and while in the interchange program, a par-
ticipant might never actually fly aboard the aircraft in which it
had purchased an interest. At the same time, at its own expense,
EJA was required to inspect, service, repair, overhaul, and test
the aircraft in order to maintain its FAA certification. EJA fur-
ther agreed to pay for fuel and to pay the salary and the travel
and lodging expenses of the crew. It also agreed to pay hangar
and tie-down costs, landing fees, and in-flight food and beverage
expenses. Finally, EJA agreed to obtain, at its own expense, all-
risk aircraft hull insurance and liability insurance."'
106 Id. at 1468 (emphasis added).
107 Id.
I- Id. 1468-1469 (emphasis added).
109 Id. at 1469 (emphasis added).
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The court acknowledged that Texaco Air had an ownership
interest in the aircraft, but concluded that this ownership right
was severely limited:
While it is true that Texaco Air was a fifty percent owner of
NillQS, its ownership interest was highly fettered. To begin
with, in order to purchase its interest in the first place, Texaco
Air had to enter into the management agreement, the Owners
Agreement, and the interchange agreement. It also had to agree
that, so long as Nl11QS was being operated under those agree-
ments, it would not sell or otherwise transfer its interest in the
aircraft - except to an affiliate - without the prior written consent
of EJS. Furthermore, any buyer had to agree to assume Texaco
Air's obligations under each of the above three agreements. In
addition, together the management agreement, the Owners
Agreement, and the interchange agreement served to signifi-
cantly restrict Texaco Air's day-to-day use of NilIQS. Thus,
NIlIQS was painted in the NetJets colors, and Texaco Air was
not allowed to customize it or identify it with its corporate logo.
In addition, Texaco Air incurred a surcharge when it used the
aircraft for more than its allotted number of hours, and it was
prohibited from using the aircraft outside of certain specified ge-
ographic areas without EJA's prior consent. Finally, EJA reserved
for itself exclusive use of NlllQS for its charter service and for
training its pilots when the aircraft was not being used by Texaco
Air and its other owners.' 10
The court agreed with the Court of Claims that the EJA pro-
gram was essentially identical to a commercial air charter busi-
ness. Because of the limitations of the program, EJA essentially
had exclusive right to the use of the aircraft:
The Court of Federal Claims stated that it detected "negligible
differences between the NetJets aircraft interchange program
and the operation of a commercial air charter business." We
agree. "It has been recognized that for tax purposes the sub-
stance rather than the form of a transaction is generally control-
ling." While it is true that Texaco Air held legal title in Nl IQS
to the extent of its fifty percent ownership interest, the agree-
ments which framed the NetJets program placed extensive limita-
tions on the exercise of that interest. At the same time, EJA
coordinated all of NlllQS' flights with the needs of the other
participants in the interchange program and reserved for itself
exclusive use of the aircraft for its charter service and for training
pilots when the aircraft was not being used by one of its owners.
Texaco Air's highly circumscribed ownership interest in NllIQS
110 Id.
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simply was the vehicle through which Texaco Air entered into,
and was allowed to participate in, an arrangement pursuant to
which it obtained from EJA transportation from one airport to
another. We hold that, through its NetJets program, EJA was in
the "business of transporting persons or property for hire by air." 11'
The court then considered and rejected EJA's final argument
that Congress did not intend that the tax would apply to these
kinds of flights." 2
3. Critique
Both the IRS and the court held that the fractional company
was providing taxable transportation services. Interestingly, they
took different paths to reach the same result.
Both the IRS and the court were able to ignore the fact that
the fractional company did not have an interest in the aircraft.
The court relied on the "substance over form" doctrine. The
IRS referred to the "totality of the circumstances."
The IRS then relied on their standard test, holding that the
fractional company had "possession, command and control" of
the aircraft. Interestingly, the court did not mention either
"possession, command and control" or "operational control,"
but instead held that the fractional company was engaged in the
"business of transporting persons or property for hire by air."
The decision of the court is also noteworthy in that, in con-
trast with the fractional rulings, the court did not hold that an
owner could be taxed on the value of the use of his own aircraft.
a. Substance Over Form
Under the fractional contracts, the interest owner obtains the
flight crew and the aircraft from two different sources: the pilots
from the management company and the aircraft from other in-
terest owners. Ordinarily, this would be considered dry lease of
the aircraft, a nontaxable transaction." I Both the IRS and the
court ignored these legal distinctions by relying on the "sub-
stance over form" doctrine.
The "substance over form" doctrine is one of the "common
law" doctrines relied on by the courts to prevent taxpayers from
' I Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted)
112 Id. at 1470.
ll- See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-256, 1968-1 C.B. 489 and Tech. Adv. Mem. 81-31-051
(May 8, 1981).
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abusing the tax laws." 4 However, reliance on the substance over
form doctrine appears to have been unwarranted in this case.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Frank Lyon Co. v. United
States demonstrates that there are limits on the application of
the substance over form doctrine." 5 In that case, a bank de-
cided to build a new headquarters building, which they origi-
nally planned to finance by selling debentures. However,
because of limitations imposed by banking regulations, the use
of debentures was not feasible. As a result, the decision was
made to sell the bank building to the taxpayer and to lease back
the building. This approach was approved by the banking regu-
lators. Following the sale, the taxpayer claimed a deduction for
depreciation on the building. The IRS argued that the transac-
tion was really a loan from the taxpayer to the bank and that the
taxpayer was not the true owner of the building. Consequently,
the taxpayer was not entitled to claim depreciation on the build-
ing. The case was taken to District Court, which agreed with the
taxpayer. The Appellate Court reversed. 1 6 The Supreme Court
agreed to hear the case to resolve a conflict between the
Circuits.
The Supreme Court began by discussing other cases dealing
with determination of ownership of property for tax purposes
and then referred to doctrine of "substance over form," stating
that:
In applying this doctrine of substance over form, the Court has
looked to the objective economic realities of a transaction rather
than to the particular form the parties employed. The Court has
never regarded "the simple expedient of drawing up papers," as
controlling for tax purposes when the objective economic reali-
ties are to the contrary. "In the field of taxation, administrators
of the laws, and the courts, are concerned with substance and
realities, and formal written documents are not rigidly
binding." 17
"14 See Statement of Lindy Paull, Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on Taxation,
Testimony Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, Hearing on Corpo-
rate Tax Shelters (Nov. 10, 1999) (The "common law" doctrines include "the
sham transaction doctrine, the economic substance doctrine, the business pur-
pose doctrine, the substance over form doctrine, and the step transaction
doctrine").
115 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
116 Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1976).
117 Id. at 573 (quoting Comm'r v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 291 (1946) and Helver-
ing v. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939)).
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However, upon reviewing the facts, the court concluded that
the form of the transaction should govern for tax purposes:
In short, we hold that where, as here, [1] there is a genuine mul-
tiple-party transaction [2] with economic substance [3] which is
compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realities, [4]
is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and [5] is not
shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless la-
bels attached, the Government should honor the allocation of
rights and duties effectuated by the parties. Expressed another
way, so long as the lessor retains significant and genuine attrib-
utes of the traditional lessor status, the form of the transaction
adopted by the parties governs for tax purposes.'l l
The factors mentioned in Frank Lyon are also present in the
typical fractional program: (1) a multi-party transaction (the
owner, other interest owners and the fractional company); (2)
with economic substance (reducing aircraft costs while requir-
ing the owner to assume responsibility for risk of loss and opera-
tional control of the aircraft); (3) compelled or encouraged by
business or regulatory realities (the desire to operate under FAR
Part 91); (4) is imbued with tax independent considerations
(same as items (2) and (3)); and (5) is not shaped by tax avoid-
ance features (apart from wanting the same tax treatment as
other Part 91 owners).
b. Business of Transporting Persons or Property for Hire
by Air
The court's conclusion that the management company was
"in the business of transporting persons or property for hire by
air" is contrary to existing precedent."I9 The court concluded
that the statute did not require the management company to
provide the aircraft. According to the court, all that was re-
quired was that the management company "use" the aircraft, cit-
ing the dictionary definition of use. 120
The court did not appear to be aware that the tax on trans-
portation of property incorporates the same phrase and applies
Hi8 Id. at 583-84 (bracketed numbers added).
119 Although the court cited the statute as referring to transportation "for com-
pensation or hire," the court viewed the issue as involving transportation "for
hire." This difference does not appear to be significant in light of the broad
definition given to "for hire." See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mems. 94-41-005 (June 27,
1994) and 86-20-002 (Jan. 23, 1986).
210 Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 125 F.3d 1463, 1468 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
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"only to amounts paid to a person engaged in the business of
transporting property by air for hire.' 12 1 Furthermore, the
courts interpreting this language had uniformly held that, in or-
der for a company to be engaged in the transportation business,
the company must provide not only the operators, but also the
equipment.
In Bridge Auto Renting Corp. v. Pedick, the court was asked to
determine whether amounts paid to a company that provided
both the trucks and the drivers were subject to the transporta-
tion tax. 122 The company argued that the tax did not apply be-
cause they were merely leasing the trucks to the customers.
Citing the language of the statute, the court stated that:
The precise problem is whether the receipts taxed were within
the meaning of the statutory language, "amounts paid ['for trans-
portation * * * of property'] to a person engaged in the business
of transporting property for hire."'
' 23
The court identified the standard to be applied:
So it would seem that the decision here should turn upon the
correct answer to an easily stated question. Did the appellant in
fact furnish substantially all the facilities for, and perform substan-
tially all of the functions for, transporting the property of the
forty-two customers whose payments to it were taxed?
124
The court applied this "substantially all" test to hold that the
company was engaged in providing transportation for hire. This
same test has been applied by the courts in a number of cases as
a basis for holding that a company, which provided both the
equipment and operator, was engaged in the business of trans-
porting property for hire.1'
2 5
121 I.R.C. § 4271(a) (West 2002).
122 Bridge Auto Renting Corp. v. Pedrick, 174 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 338 U. S. 850 (1949). The court was interpreting § 3469 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939. See discussion at II A, supra, for a brief history of the
transportation tax.
123 Bridge Auto Renting Corp., 174 F.2d at 733-34.
124 Id. at 737 (emphasis added).
125 See, e.g., Assoc. Dry Goods Corp. v. United States, 348 F.2d 138 (2d Cir.
1965) (captive shipping company); Earle v. Bebler, 180 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir.
1950); Dal-Worth Shippers Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 211 F. Supp. 590 (N.D.
Tex. 1962) (captive shipping company); Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. United
States, 141 F. Supp. 64 (N.D. Ill. 1956);JohnJ. Casale, Inc. v. United States, 86 F.
Supp. 167 (Ct. Cl. 1949) (result followed where similar facts).
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c. Possession, Command and Control
Although the court did not cite the possession, command and
control test, a literal reading of that test also indicates that, in
order for the transportation tax to apply, the same company
must provide both plane and pilots. This is because, under the
possession, command and control test, the person providing the
pilots (or an agent of that person) must have possession and
command and control of the aircraft. Conversely, where pilots are
used to fly the owner's aircraft, then the owner must have relin-
quished possession and command and control of the aircraft. If
any of these elements are lacking, then that person is not pro-
viding transportation. This is consistent with the "substantially
all" test adopted by the courts, since that test requires that the
person providing transportation also provide the means of
transportation.
In a fractional program, the management company does not
meet these requirements because, during the period the aircraft
is used by an interest owner, the management company has no
right to possession of the aircraft. Instead, the interest owner
has possession of the aircraft during the period of use, either as
a joint owner of the aircraft or as a lessee. 126 The fact that the
interest owner allows the management company to use the air-
craft does not mean that possession has been transferred. At
most, the owner has merely given the management company a
license to use the aircraft. 27 However, even this characteriza-
tion is questionable, particularly since the owner is also on
board the aircraft.
In the fractional rulings, the IRS conceded that the interest
owner was the legal owner of the aircraft, but ignored the ab-
sence of the right to possession by asserting broadly that under
the totality of the circumstances, the owners have relinquished
126 The fact that the management company schedules the aircraft or may have
possession of the aircraft between periods of use is irrelevant. The rental of a
condominium is still a rental, even if a management company maintains and
schedules the use of the property. The short-term rental of an automobile is still
a rental, even though the rental agency has possession of the automobiles be-
tween rentals. Nor is inability to choose a particular aircraft significant. In the
case of condominiums and cars, the user is required to take what is available.
127 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 84-4, 1984-1 C.B. 19 ("The distinction between a lease and
license, as traditionally expressed, is that a lease is a conveyance of exclusive pos-
session of specific property, for a term less than that of the grantor. MILTON R.
FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LExSES, § 37.1, at 1259 (3d ed. 1978).
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possession, command and control of the aircraft to the manage-
ment company. 128
This conclusion is hard to reconcile with other transportation
tax rulings. In both Rev. Rul. 74-123, which was cited as support,
and Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-04-007, which was decided at the same
time as the second fractional ruling, the owner had clearly relin-
quished operational control of the aircraft to the management
company.1 29 In Rev. Rul. 74-123, the IRS noted: "The company
has the sole responsibility for the safe operation of Government-
owned aircraft and holds the agency harmless from all claims
resulting from the performance of its services."1 30 In Tech. Adv.
Mem. 94-04-007, the IRS noted that "the owners have given to
the taxpayer . . . full operational control over the aircraft
whether the air transportation is provided via charter to a third
party or to an owner. '"131 Under these circumstances, one could
easily infer an agreement to relinquish possession of the air-
craft.1 3 2 However, in the case of a fractional agreement, the
agreements clearly provide that the interest owner has "opera-
tional control" of the aircraft. Consequently, there is no lan-
guage from which one could infer that the interest owner has
relinquished control of the aircraft.
Perhaps the closest analogy is provided by Priv. Ltr. Rul.
7204198540A which involved a management company arrange-
ment that was similar in operation to a fractional arrange-
ment. 3 ' However, in that ruling, the customer leased the
aircraft and obtained the flight crew from two separate, but re-
lated, companies, which caused the IRS to conclude that "the
combined furnishing by [the management company] and [the
leasing company] of the personnel, service and aircraft results in
the furnishing of taxable transportation of persons by air."1 34
128 Tech. Adv. Mems. 93-14-002 (Dec. 22, 1992) and 94-04-006 (Oct. 12, 1993).
129 Rev. Rul. 74-123, 1974-1 C.B. 318 and Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-04-007 (Oct. 20,
1993).
130 Rev. Rul. 74-123, 1974-1 C.B. 318.
13' Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-04-007 (Oct. 20, 1993).
132 See also Rev. Rul. 56-608, 1956-2 C.B. 878, declared obsolete by Rev. Rul. 69-
227, 1969-1 C.B. 315, where the IRS held that the transportation tax applied
where "the shipper owns the tank truck equipment in which its product is trans-
ported by the carrier."
,3 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7204198540A (Apr. 19, 1972).
134 Id. (emphasis added). Although the customer was considered the owner of
the aircraft for income tax purposes, the IRS apparently did not consider that an
important factor for transportation tax purposes.
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The IRS characterization of fractional programs is also hard
to reconcile with the IRS characterization of similar programs.
For example, in Tech. Adv. Mem. 82-41-010, the IRS considered
an arrangement where the taxpayers purchased railroad boxcars
and entered into a "Lease and Management Agreement" with a
management company to handle the operation of boxcars oper-
ated under the railroad interchange system. -13 5 This required
the manager to keep track of the boxcars and to handle the
collection of revenues from the interchange of boxcars. The
IRS was asked to consider whether the arrangement should be
considered a management contract or a lease to the manage-
ment company.
The IRS cited several definitions of lease, all of which involved
a relinquishment of possession."" In deciding whether the ar-
rangement was a management agreement, the IRS concluded
that the key factors were (1) the degree of control over the ven-
ture exercised by the taxpayer/owners; and (2) the risk of loss
retained by them.'3 7
The IRS concluded that the taxpayer had the requisite degree
of control, stating that:
The first factor to be examined is which party had control of
the venture. As in Meagher, Corp M was required to keep ade-
quate records and supply X with such reports regarding the use
of the boxcars as X may reasonably request, use reasonable ef-
forts to integrate X's boxcars into the fleet of boxcars controlled
by Corp M, obtain insurance coverage for the boxcars, and pay
the net earnings of the boxcars to X within a specified period of
time. Thus, the factors cited by the Tax Court in Meagher as
indicating sufficient owner's control over the venture are present
in this case.
Not only was Corp M's control of the boxcars subject to the
limitations of the Agreement, but its control and possession of
the boxcars were at all times subject to the rules of the in-
terchange system. Furthermore, we believe that there has not
135 Tech. Adv. Mem. 82-41-010 (Jun. 30, 1982).
I3 Id. "[A] lease is a transfer of an interest in and possession of property for a
prescribed period of time in exchange for an agreed consideration, called
'rent."' State Nat'l Bank of El Paso v. United States, 509 F.2d 832, 835 (5th Cir.
1975).
137 Id. The IRS cited Meagher v. Comm'r, 36 T.C. 1091 (1977), for this conclu-
sion. The IRS also cited State Nat'l Bank f El Paso v. United States, 509 F.2d 832
(5th Cir. 1975), and Kingsbury v. Comm'r, 65 T.C. 1068 (1976), for the statement
that: "The existence of control over the venture by the property owner and a risk
of loss on the property owner are key factors indicating a management contract."
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been a transfer to Corp M of the right to exploit the boxcars for
its own benefit. Rather, the purpose of the transfer of the cars to
Corp M was to enable X to earn car hire revenues in the in-
terchange system."8
The IRS also concluded that the taxpayer also had the requi-
site risk of loss. The management company was protected from
risk of loss by a "hold harmless" agreement and the insurance
policy. On the other hand, the taxpayer was required to pay
property taxes on the boxcars and was required to pay a man-
agement fee even if the boxcars generated no revenue.' '
Based on this analysis, the IRS concluded that the manage-
ment company was merely providing a management service.
This ruling is interesting for several reasons. First, as in the
case of a fractional arrangement, the ruling involves an indepen-
dent interchange of property between unrelated persons not in-
cluding the management company. Second, the ruling held
that the property was not leased to the management company,
which confirms that, in this kind of situation, the management
company does not have possession of the property. Third, the
ruling held that the control requirement was established by the
contractual requirements that the management company main-
tain adequate records and obtain insurance and by the rules of
the interchange system. All of these elements are present in a
fractional arrangement. Furthermore, unlike the boxcar ruling,
there is a chance that the interest owner will actually use his own
aircraft.
d. Operational Control
While the IRS is not bound by FAA principles, Executive Jet
Aviation appears to be the first case where the IRS and the
courts held that the transportation tax applied where the user
had "operational control" of the aircraft. This is unfortunate,
because the "operational control" test could have provided a
useful "bright line" test, particularly in the case of large civil air-
craft for which the FAA "truth in leasing" rules require a written
lease agreement that specifies responsibility for "operational
control" of the aircraft.') Nor is assumption of "operational
control" an empty gesture. The party assuming responsibility
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parties. Instead, we are now left with the vague standard of
whether under "the totality of the circumstances," the person
providing the pilots has "possession, command and control of
the aircraft" (the IRS test) or is using the aircraft "in a business
of transporting persons or property for compensation or hire by
air" (the court test).
e. The Amount Paid
The fractional rulings held that the interest owner should be
taxed, not only on the hourly charge, but also on the value of
the use of the aircraft. However, in Executive Jet Aviation, the
court held only that the interest owner should be taxed on the
hourly charge. There is no indication that the IRS attempted to
argue otherwise.
C. CONSEQUENCES AND REMAINING ISSUES
While there is room to argue with both the conclusion and
the reasoning of both the IRS and the courts, neither the IRS
nor the fractional companies appear to be eager to pursue the
matter further. As things stand, the decision was a partial victory
for both sides. The decision was a victory for the IRS because
the courts held that interest owners are required to pay trans-
portation tax on the hourly charge. The decision was a victory
for the interest owners because the courts did not impose tax on
the management fee or the value of the use of the aircraft. The
net effect is that interest owners are required to pay more tax
than other Part 91 operators, but less tax than charter
customers.
While a fractional company could choose to ignore the deci-
sion of the court, this is not a practical option. If the company
were wrong, the company could be held liable for the tax.' 41 It
is far safer simply to collect the tax.
The biggest remaining issue has to do with the computation
of hourly charges. Because the hourly charges are subject to tax
and the management fees are not, fractional companies might
be tempted to reclassify expenses from hourly charges to man-
agement fees. The IRS excise tax auditors are well aware of this
temptation.
141 I.R.C. § 4263(c) (West 2002).
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III. INCOME TAX ISSUES
A. THE GENERAL RULES
1. The Income Tax
The current version of the federal income tax was enacted as
part of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and is
codified in 26 U.S.C. 1 et seq. Most States also have an income
tax and follow the federal principles regarding the computation
of taxable income. 142
2. Taxation of Use of Own Aircraft
Where an aircraft is used in connection with a trade or busi-
ness, a deduction is generally allowed for the costs associated
with the ownership and use of the aircraft.143 The cost of the
aircraft is not currently deductible, but it is capitalized and de-
ducted over time using the depreciation (or cost recovery)
deduction.144
a. The Depreciation Deduction
The law provides that "[t] here shall be allowed as a deprecia-
tion deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear
and tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence)"
of property used in a trade or business or held for the produc-
tion of income. 41 Prior to 1981, the amount of the "reasonable
allowance" generally varied depending on the facts and circum-
stances of each case. In 1971, Congress attempted to reduce the
uncertainty, by adding a provision allowing the use of the class
life asset depreciation range (CLADR). 46 In 1981, Congress ad-
ded the accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS), which allowed
most personal property, including aircraft, to be depreciated
over 5 years in accordance with a prescribed table. 4 7 In 1986,
142 In order to simplify the computation of State taxable income, most States
have adopted "conformity" legislation which makes federal taxable income the
starting point for computation of state taxable income.
143 I.R.C. § 162 (West 2002). The tax laws also allow deduction of depreciation
and other expenses related to the production of income. I.R.C. § 167(a) (2) and
I.R.C. § 212 (West 2002), respectively. However, because of their limited applica-
tion, those rules will not be discussed.
144 The capitalization of costs is required by I.R.C. § 263 (West 2002). The
depreciation deduction is allowed by I.R.C. § 167.
145 I.R.C. § 167(a) (West 2002).
146 I.R.C. § 167(m) (effective for property placed in service in 1971 and later).
147 I.R.C. § 168 (West 1981) (for property placed in service and tax years end-
ing in 1981 and later). Most personal property was considered 5-year property
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Congress replaced the ACRS rules with the modified ACRS rules
(MACRS) which increase the depreciation rates, the number of
asset classes and the depreciation lives. 148
b. Tax Ownership
The person entitled to tax depreciation is referred to as the
"tax owner" of the property. In general, the "tax owner" is the
person who suffers an economic loss by reason of the deprecia-
tion and erosion in the value of the property.1 49 In most cases,
the tax owner is the legal owner of the property.
Theses principles have been applied to determine tax owner-
ship in the context of a lease. In the case of an ordinary "operat-
ing lease," the lessor is considered the tax owner of the
property. However, in the case of a "financing lease" the lessee
is considered the tax owner. In effect, a financing lease is
treated as a sale of the property to the lessee, financed by the
lessor. For example, in Helvering v. F & R Lazarus & Co., the
Supreme Court held that the lessee was the tax owner, stating
that:
While it may more often be that he who is both owner and user
bears the burden of wear and exhaustion of business property in
the nature of capital, one who is not the owner may nevertheless
bear the burden of exhaustion of capital investment. Where it
has been shown that a lessee using property in a trade or business
must incur the loss resulting from depreciation of capital he has
invested, the lessee has been held entitled to the statutory
deduction.50
In Grodt & McKay Realty v. Comm'r, ' the Tax Court listed
eight factors which have been used by the courts to determine
whether a purported sale has resulted in a transfer of tax
ownership:
(1) Whether legal title passes . . . ; (2) how the parties treat the
transaction... ; (3) whether an equity was acquired in the prop-
erty... ; (4) whether the contract creates a present obligation on
the seller to execute and deliver a deed and a present obligation
on the purchaser to make payments... ; (5) whether the right of
pursuant to the rules prescribed in I.R.C. § 168(c) (2) (West 1981). As prescribed
by I.R.C. § 168(b)(1) (West 1981), the depreciation deductions for each of the
five years were 15%, 22%, 21%, 21% and 21%, respectively.
148 I.R.C. § 168 (West 2002).
149 See, e.g., Weiss v. Weiner, 279 U.S. 333 (1929).
150 Helvering v. F & R Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 254 (1939).
15, Grodt & McKay Realty v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 1221 (1981).
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possession is vested in the purchaser .. .; (6) which- party pays
the property taxes ... ; (7) which party bears the risk of loss or
damage to the property . . .; and (8) which party receives the
profits from the operation and sale of the property..152
c. Class Life
Under the MACRS rules, the recovery period is determined
by reference to the class life of the property.'53 The class life is
determined by reference to the CLADR rules.1 54 In the case of
aircraft, the class life will vary depending on whether the aircraft
falls into asset class 00.21 or asset class 45.
Asset class 00.21 includes "airplanes (airframes and engines),
except those used in commercial or contract carrying of passen-
gers or freight, and all helicopters (airframes and engines).' 5 5
Aircraft and helicopters included in asset class 00.21 have a class
life of 6 years.1 56 Property with a class life of 6 years is consid-
ered 5-year property, 15 7 which has a recovery period of 5
years. 15
8
Asset class 45 is entitled "Air Transport" and includes "assets
(except helicopters) used in commercial and contract carrying
of passengers and freight by air."' 59 Aircraft included in asset
class 45 have a class life of 20 years. 6 " Property with a class life
of 12 years is considered 7-year property,"' which has a recovery
period of 7 years. 16 2
152 Id. at 1237 (citations omitted). In some cases, the seller of property is still
be considered to be the tax owner, particularly where there is a repurchase op-
tion which protects the purchaser from risk of loss. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 83-47, 1983-
1 CB 63 ("Investors are not entitled to deductions under the accelerated cost
recovery system for townhouses that are purchased and immediately leased back
with the stipulation that they will be resold to the original seller a year and a day
following the original sale at a predetermined price.").
15' I.R.C. § 168(c), (e)(1) (West 2002).
154 I.R.C. § 168(i) (1) (West 2002) provides, inter alia, that: "the term 'class life'
means the class life (if any) which would be applicable with respect to any prop-
erty as of January 1, 1986, under subsection (m) of section 167."
155 Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674.
156 Id.
157 I.R.C. § 168(e)(1) (West 2002).
158 I.R.C. § 168(c) (West 2002).
159 Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 CB 674.
160 Id.
161 I.R.C. § 168(e)(1) (West 2002).
162 I.R.C. § 168(c) (West 2002).
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In general, aircraft operated under Part 91 are considered to
fall in asset class 00.21 while aircraft operated under Part 135
are considered to fall under asset class 45.163
3. Taxation of Joint Ownership Agreement
In general, the income tax laws treat the joint owner of prop-
erty as the tax owner of their share of the property. This means
that each of the joint owners of an aircraft is entitled to deduct
the depreciation and other expenses relating to their share of
the aircraft. 64
In some cases, a joint ownership arrangement will be consid-
ered to be a joint venture or partnership. 6 5 However, the part-
nership regulations provide that mere co-ownership of property
that is maintained, kept in repair, and rented or leased does not
constitute a partnership. 166
4. Taxation of Dry Lease Exchange
There do not appear to be any cases or rulings specifically
addressing the taxation of a dry lease exchange.
An undertaking by several taxpayers to contribute and share
property using offsetting leases does not appear to create taxa-
ble income. Such an undertaking does not create a separate
entity for federal tax purposes.1 67 Furthermore, the sharing of
the use of property does not appear to create a taxable "acces-
sion to wealth." 168
163 Where an aircraft is operated under both Part 91 and Part 135, the CLADR
rules provide that the asset class shall be determined by considering the primary
use of the property during the first tax year of service. See Treas. Reg. 1.167-(a)-
1 (b) (4) (iii) (b) (2002).
164 See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-20-010 (Feb. 10, 1998) (depreciation deduction of
joint owner of a power plant); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-32-039 (May 13, 1986) (deprecia-
tion deduction of joint owners of nuclear-fueled generation facility).
6- I.R.C. § 7701 (a) (2) (West 2002) provides that "The term "partnership" in-
cludes a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organiza-
tion, through or by means of which any business, financial operation, or venture
is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of this title, a trust or estate or
a corporation."
166 Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a) (2002); Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. 261.
167 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(2) (2002) ("a joint undertaking merely to
share expenses does not create a separate entity for federal tax purposes").
- See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-10-022 (Dec. 7, 2000) ("Gross income includes
income realized in any form, whether in money, property, or services. Section
1.61-1 (a) of the Income Tax Regulations. This definition encompasses all "acces-
sions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete do-
minion.") (quoting Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955)).
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The use of the dry lease exchange should not affect the de-
preciation deduction. The owner of an aircraft which is leased
to others can claim depreciation in the same manner as any
other owner.'69 For purposes of determining class life, the
CLADR rules provide that "the asset guideline class for such
property shall be determined as if the property were owned by
the lessee."' 70 For example, if the lessee primarily uses the air-
craft to provide commercial transportation, then the aircraft
would be considered "Air Transport" property.
B. CHARACTERIZATION OF FRACTIONAL PROGRAMS
1. In General
There have not been any cases or rulings characterizing frac-
tional programs for federal income tax purposes. The prevail-
ing practice appears to be to characterize the fractional
program as involving the purchase of a capital interest in an air-
craft along with separate payments for operating costs and man-
agement services. The dry lease exchange is ignored.
2. The Depreciation Deduction
The decision of the court in Executive Jet Aviation has raised
some concerns that, for income tax purposes, the fractional in-
terest owner might not be considered the owner of an aircraft or
that the aircraft cannot be depreciated using a 5-year recovery
period. However, a close review of the case indicates that these
concerns are unfounded.
a. Tax Ownership
At the outset, it should be noted that that someone has to be
the tax owner of the aircraft. As compared to all the other possi-
ble candidates (e.g. the seller, the management company and
the other participants), there are a number of compelling rea-
sons why the interest owner should be considered the tax owner.
First, under the fractional program documents, the interest
owner is clearly considered the owner of the aircraft for FAA
and commercial purposes. As discussed in connection with the
transportation tax, the Supreme Court in Frank Lyon Co. v.
United States indicated that the characterization of a transaction
169 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 80-127, 1980-1 C.B. 53 (lessor of shipping containers enti-
tled to deduct depreciation).
170 Treas. Reg. § 1.167-(a)-11 (e) (3) (iii) (2002).
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should be respected as long as the transaction has economic
substance and a valid business purpose. 7' And, as previously
discussed, the fractional program clearly meets those require-
ments. The Frank Lyon case has particular application here be-
cause the question in that case was also one of tax ownership.
Second, as compared to all the other possible tax owners, the
interest owner is the one with the greatest risk of loss. If there is
a decline (or increase) in the value of the aircraft, the interest
owner is the one who will suffer (or profit) from that change.
The conclusion that the interest owner is the tax owner is fur-
ther supported by Tech. Adv. Mem. 82-41-010, relating to box-
cars used in the railroad interchange system.' 7 2 In that ruling,
the owner of the boxcars was claiming depreciation on the box-
cars and no objection was raised to that treatment. To the con-
trary, the ruling held that the owner was entitled to claim
investment credit, further proof of tax ownership.
The court in Executive Jet Aviation said nothing which would
indicate that the interest owner should not be considered the
tax owner. The conclusion of the court that the management
company (EJA) was providing transportation has no impact on
the question of tax ownership because a person can be the pro-
vider of taxable air transportation and still not be the tax owner
of the aircraft.' 73 Furthermore, the court specifically rejected
the notion that the management company was the owner or les-
sor of the aircraft, "We reject EJA's argument that it was neces-
sary for it to provide aircraft to Texaco Air by being an owner or
lessor in order for Texaco Air's flights under the NetJets pro-
gram to be subject to the transportation tax."' 74 At most, the
court concluded that the management company was merely "us-
ing" the aircraft in their transportation business - which, without
more, is not enough to switch tax ownership away from the in-
terest owner.
b. Class Life
The question of class life is a closer question. The court in
Executive Jet Aviation indicated that the management company
used the aircraft "in a business of transporting persons or prop-
'71 Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
172 Tech. Adv. Mem. 82-41-010 (Jun. 30, 1982).
173 For example, a charter company might use aircraft leased from another
company which is the tax owner of the aircraft.
174 Executive jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 125 F.3d 1463, 1468 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
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erty for compensation or hire by air." Under the MACRS rules,
an aircraft which is primarily used in commercial and contract
carrying of passengers and freight by air is considered "air trans-
port" property. 75 On the surface, the similarity in language
strongly suggests that fractional aircraft should be considered
air transport property. However, a close review of the case does
not support this conclusion.
Where property is leased, the CLADR rules provide that the
lessee is considered to be the user of the property. Under the
fractional agreements, the aircraft is leased to the other frac-
tional participants. The court in Executive Jet Aviation said noth-
ing which would indicate that the participants are not the
lessees. Since these participants are contractually prohibited
from using the aircraft to provide "commercial transportation,"
the aircraft should not be classified as "air transport" property.
The fact that the court in Executive Jet Aviation held that the
management company was using the aircraft should not under-
mine this conclusion because the term "use" was defined in the
broadest possible sense, as "the act or practice of using some-
thing. ' 176 Thus, while the court could say that the management
company was using the aircraft, the same could be said of the
lessee and everyone else on board the aircraft. Under these cir-
cumstances, the CLADR rules indicate that the class life should
be determined by reference to the lessee use.
C. CONSEQUENCES AND REMAINING ISSUES
1. Tax Depreciation
As long as the interest owner has the risk of loss of value on
the resale of the aircraft, the tax owner should be considered
the tax owner of the aircraft and should be entitled to claim the
depreciation deduction on the aircraft. To date, the IRS has not
challenged the depreciation of the aircraft by the owner or the
use of the 5-year class life. 177
175 Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674.
176 Executive Jet Aviation, 125 F.3d at 1468 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW IN.
TERNATIONAl. DICTIONARY 2523 (3d ed. 1986).
177 The IRS may have practical reasons for not challenging this treatment.
First, if the IRS were to successfully challenge the owner's right to claim deprecia-
tion, the likely result is that the fractional company would be entitled to claim
depreciation (albeit under the 7-year class life). This would lead to a net revenue
loss because the fractional company would be able to depreciate all of the aircraft
while, under the existing rules, not every owner is claiming depreciation on their
aircraft. Second, if the IRS were to rely on Executive Jet Aviation to argue that the
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2. Dry Lease Exchange
The use of the dry lease exchange does not appear to create
any other tax issues. First, although the IRS has indicated in the
transportation tax rulings that a "wet lease" interchange is "es-
sentially a barter exchange,"' 8 there is nothing to indicate that
the dry lease exchange should be considered a barter exchange
for income tax purposes. 9 In contrast with a taxable barter ex-
change, a dry lease exchange does not involve a taxable "acces-
sion to wealth," but merely an allocation of usage which has
already been paid for. 8 Second, although the aircraft is being
leased to third parties, the passive activity loss (PAL) rules do
not appear to apply since the lease is not, in itself, a trade or
business. "'
3. Administrative Issues
The fractional programs do create some unique administra-
tive issues. For example, where an employee uses a company
aircraft for personal travel, the imputed income rules require an
amount to be included in income, which can vary depending on
fractional aircraft are "air transport" property and lost, then fractional companies
might be encouraged to relitigate the transportation tax issue.
178 See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-02-004 (Sept. 6, 1994).
179 The conclusion that the dry lease exchange is a taxable barter exchange
would not have an impact on a business owner since any barter income would be
offset by barter expense. Instead, the conclusion might have an impact on a non-
business owner if that owner were prohibited from offsetting barter income with
barter expenses. Also, the fractional company might be required to report the
barter transactions pursuant to I.R.C. § 6045 (West 2002).
180 See, e.g., Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (holding
that punitive damages received by the taxpayer were taxable because they were,
inter alia "undeniable accessions to wealth"). The conclusion that there is no
taxable barter exchange is further supported by a review of the barter exchange
reporting rules. I.R.C. § 6045 requires the reporting of barter transactions.
I.R.C. § 6045(c) defines a barter exchange as "any organization of members pro-
viding property or services who jointly contract to trade or barter such property
or services." In a fractional program, there is no exchange of property or ser-
vices, merely the exchange of the use of property. Finally, a barter exchange
involves an accounting for the value of property or services provided in order to
insure that the contributor is properly compensated. However, in the case of a
fractional program, there is no accounting for the value of the use of the aircraft.
181 The PAL rules were intended to prevent taxpayers from offsetting earned
income with losses from passive "tax shelters." I.R.C. § 469(c) (1) (West Supp.
2002) defines a "passive activity" as any activity which, inter alia, "involves the
conduct of any trade or business." In a fractional program, the lease is not a
separate trade or business, but is simply a mechanism for sharing aircraft with
other owners.
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the type of aircraft used. 8 2 In a fractional program, the type of
aircraft can vary from trip to trip.
IV. STATE TAXATION OF FRACTIONAL PROGRAMS
A. BACKGROUND
In addition to the State income tax, there are a wide variety of
State taxes which apply to aircraft, the most significant of which
are the sales and use tax and the property and/or registration
tax.
The sales tax is a one-time tax on the sale of taxable property
or services in the State. The use tax, which is intended as a
"backstop" to the sales tax, is a one-time tax on the use of taxa-
ble property or services in the State. The tax amount is gener-
ally a percentage of the sales or purchase price.
The property tax is an annual tax on property located in the
State. The tax amount is generally a percentage of the value of
the property. The registration tax is annual tax on the use of an
aircraft in the State. The registration tax is generally imposed
"in lieu of' the property tax. The tax amount may be based on
any number of factors, including the weight of the aircraft.
B. FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE TAX
When Airport and Airway Revenue Act of 1970 was enacted,
Congress created an Airport and Airways Trust Fund which was
to be funded by the federal transportation tax and the fuel
tax.183 In Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta
Airlines, the Supreme Court held that a State could also impose
a head tax on air transportation. 8 4 In response, Congress en-
acted the "Anti-Head Tax Act" as part of The Airport Develop-
ment Acceleration Act of 1973.185 This Act prohibits the
imposition of a "tax, fee, head charge, or other charge" on an
individual traveling in air commerce, the transportation of an
individual traveling in air commerce, the sale of air transporta-
tion, or the gross receipts from that air commerce or transporta-
182 See generally 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.61-21(b) (6), (7) (general valuation rule consid-
ers charter value of aircraft) and 26 C.F.R. § 1.61-21(g)(7) (special valuation rule
considers maximum certified takeoff weight of the aircraft).
183 Pub. L. No. 91-258, 84 Stat. 219.
184 Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707
(1972).
185 Pub. L. No. 93-44, 87 Stat. 90 (as amended, reenacted, and recodified at 49
U.S.C. § 40116).
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tion. is6 In Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation, the Supreme
Court held that the Anti-Head Tax Act prohibited the imposi-
tion of a gross receipts tax on airlines, even where that tax was
"disguised" as a property tax. 187 Other State court cases have
held that the Act prohibits the imposition of a variety of State
taxes, including privilege taxes. 8 '
In the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, Congress
amended the Airway Development Acceleration Act of 1973, by
prohibiting the importing of discriminatory property taxes on
air carriers. 89 This was later upheld by the Supreme Court in
Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Board of Equalization.90
C. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
The two primary federal constitutional limitations on the
State taxation of aircraft are the "Due Process Clause" and the
"Commerce Clause." The Due Process Clause provides that no
State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law."'' The Commerce Clause states that:
"The Congress shall have Power . .. To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes." 19 2
The test most commonly applied to determine whether a tax
is constitutional was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.'93 This case significantly
changed the rules applicable to the State taxation of aircraft.
1.6 49 U.S.C. § 40116(b) provides that:
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section and section
40117 of this title, a State, a political subdivision of a State, and any
person that has purchased or leased an airport under section 47134
of this title may not levy or collect a tax, fee, head charge, or other
charge on -
(1) an individual traveling in air commerce;
(2) the transportation of an individual traveling in air commerce;
(3) the sale of air transportation; or
(4) the gross receipts from that air commerce or transportation.
187 Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Dir. of Taxation, 464 U.S. 7 (1983)
188 See, e.g., Arizona Dep't of Revenue v. Cochise Airlines, 626 P.2d 596 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1980) (transaction privilege tax); Republic Airlines, Inc. v. State, 427
N.W.2d 182 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (single business tax).
1- Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, 671 (1982) (originally codified as 49 U.S.C.
§ 1513(d); later codified as 49 U.S.C. § 40116(d)).
190 Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Bd. of Equalization, 480 U.S. 123 (1987).
191 U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
192 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
13 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
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The impact of this case can be demonstrated by a review of the
case law.
1. The Due Process Clause and the "Nexus" Requirement
The current formulation of the "nexus" requirement was first
stated by Supreme Court in Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland.I94 Miller
Brothers was a merchandising company which operated a retail
store in Delaware. Some of the customers who purchased items
at the store were from Maryland and asked the company to ship
the items to them. In some cases, these items were shipped to
the customer by common carrier, and in other cases, the items
were delivered to the customer by a company truck. Maryland
law imposed a use tax on these kinds of articles. Maryland ar-
gued that Miller Brothers should be required to collect Mary-
land use tax on the articles shipped into Maryland.
The court reviewed their prior decisions and concluded that,
"the course of decisions does reflect at least consistent adher-
ence to one time-honored concept: that due process requires some
definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person,
property or transaction it seeks to tax."'95 The court concluded that
the activities of Miller Brothers did not create the kind of link or
connection necessary to justify Maryland's imposition of the ob-
ligation to collect use tax.
In later cases, this test became referred to as the "nexus"
test.'9 6 These cases also indicated that one of the primary issues
in a Due Process case is "whether the state has given anything
for which it can ask return."'9 7
2. The Property Tax Cases and the "Situs" Requirement
The modern rules relating to property taxation can be traced
back over a century, to when the taxation of railroad equipment
became an issue. In Pullman's Palace-Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, the
Supreme Court held that an apportioned property tax could be
imposed on instrumentalities of interstate commerce.'9 8 The
194 Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S 340 (1954).
195 Id. at 344-45 (emphasis added).
196 See, e.g., Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967);
Scripto v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
197 Nat'l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756.
198 Pullman's Palace-Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891). See also
Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905) (holding that a
state may not assess taxes against property which has acquired a taxable situs
outside of the State).
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Court reasoned that a'State has the right to tax any personal
property found within its jurisdiction, whether that property is
engaged in intrastate or interstate commerce.'99
In Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, the Supreme Court first con-
sidered a case involving the taxation of aircraft./° In that case,
Northwest Airlines, which was domiciled in Minnesota, sought
to exclude some aircraft from tax. The Court held that Minne-
sota, as the domicile State, had the power to tax all aircraft en-
tering the State.2'"
In Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co.,2 012 the Supreme Court
held that Louisiana could impose an apportioned property tax
on barges engaged in interstate commerce on the Mississippi
River, observing that:
We see no practical difference so far as either the Due Process
Clause or the Commerce Clause is concerned whether it is vessels
or railroad cars that are moving in interstate commerce. The
problem under the Commerce Clause is to determine 'what por-
tion of an interstate organism may appropriately be attributed to
each of the various states in which it functions.' So far as due
process is concerned the only question is whether the tax in prac-
tical operation has relation to opportunities, benefits, or protec-
tion conferred or afforded by the taxing State. Those
requirements are satisfied if the tax is fairly apportioned to the
commerce carried on within the State.20 3
In Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization,
the Supreme Court held that Nebraska could impose an appor-
tioned tax on the Braniff fleet, even though Braniff was not
domiciled in Nebraska. 4 Braniff argued that Nebraska could
not impose a property tax because the property had not ac-
quired a "taxable situs" in the State, and hence the tax imposed
a burden on interstate commerce. The Court rejected this posi-
tion, observing that the "situs" issue was a Due Process issue, not
a Commerce Clause issue. 20 5 The court then stated that:
W'9 Pullman's Palace-Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. at 25-26.
2 t0 Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
201 Id. at 303.
202 Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
2) 1 Id. at 174 (citations omitted).
204 Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization, 347 U.S. 590
(1954).
205 Id. at 598-99 ("While the question of whether a commodity en route to
market is sufficiently settled in a state for purpose of subjection to a property tax
has been determined by this Court as a Commerce Clause question, the bare
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Thus the situs issue devolves into the question of whether eigh-
teen stops per day by appellant's aircraft is sufficient contact with
Nebraska to sustain that state's power to levy an apportioned ad
valorem tax on such aircraft. We think such regular contact is
sufficient to establish Nebraska's power to tax even though the
same aircraft do not land every day and even though none of the
aircraft is continuously within the State. The basis of the jurisdic-
tion is the habitual employment of the property within the
State.2 ° 6
In Central Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court
held a domiciliary state could not impose an unapportioned tax
on railroad cars which had acquired a tax situs in another
State. 20 ' The court listed two situations where such situs might
exist: (1) where the property travels through the State along
"fixed and regular routes; ' 208 or (2) where the property is "ha-
bitually employed" in the State. 20 9
Taken together, these Supreme Court decisions indicate the
Constitution prohibits a nondomicilary State from imposing a
property tax on an aircraft, or a fleet of aircraft, unless the air-
craft, or the fleet of aircraft, have acquired a "situs" with that
State. Situs may exist where (1) the aircraft is flown on fixed
and regular routes in the State, or (2) the aircraft is habitually
employed in the State.
And, despite the Court's analysis in Braniff Airways of "situs" as
a Due Process issue, Central Railroad Co., Ott, and Northwest Air-
lines indicate that the Court considers situs to be a Commerce
Clause issue as well.210
question whether an instrumentality of commerce has tax situs in a state for the
purpose of subjection to a property tax is one of due process.").
206 Id. at 600-01.
207 Cent. R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607 (1962).
208 Id. at 614 ("Had the record shown that appellant's cars traveled through
other States along fixed and regular routes, even if it were silent with respect to
the length of time spent in each nondomiciliary State, it would doubtless follow
that the States through which the regular traffic flowed could impose a property
tax measured by some fair apportioning formula.").
20 Id. at 615 ("Alternatively a nondomiciliary tax situs may be acquired even if
the rolling stock does not follow prescribed routes and schedules in its course
through the nondomiciliary State. . . . Habitual employment within the State of
a substantial number of cars, albeit on irregular routes, may constitute sufficient
contact to establish a tax situs permitting taxation of the average number of cars
so engaged.").
210 Cent. R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. at 611 ("Since [New York CentralR.
Co. v.] Miller this Court has decided numerous cases touching on the intricate
problems of accommodating, under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, the
taxing powers of domiciliary and other States with respect to the instrumentali-
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State court decisions indicate that, at least as far as the States
are concerned, situs requires a fairly substantial presence. For
example, in Peabody Coal Co. v. State Tax Commission, a Missouri-
based corporation argued that they should be entitled to a re-
duction of Missouri property tax because their aircraft had ac-
quired a situs in Indiana. 2 ' One aircraft made 19.1% of its
landings there and the other 31.8%. In refusing to allow appor-
tionment, the court noted that:
Here, for all the stipulation shows, the taxpayer used the two
planes for travel to Indiana and other states without any regular-
ity and solely in accordance with the requirements of its business.
There is neither the daily scheduling of Braniff nor the habitual
employment of Central Railroad. Property does not become sub-
ject to multiple taxation simply because it is often taken across a
State line. Central Railroad, supra, provides more support for the
State than for the taxpayer, by allowing unapportioned taxation
of most of the classes of railroad car discussed.
To acquire an "actual situs" in another State so as to limit the
exclusive taxing authority of the home State, there must be "con-
tinuous presence in another state which thereby supplants the
home state and acquires the taxing power over personality that
has become a permanent part of the foreign state." Peabody has
not met its burden of showing a continuous presence or "actual
situs" in Indiana.212
In other words, the court appeared to be saying that only an
airline making regularly scheduled flights into a State could
meet the situs requirement and that even a charter airline might
have trouble qualifying for apportionment. 13
ties of interstate commerce."); Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U. S.
at 174 ("We see no practical difference so far as either the Due Process Clause or
the Commerce Clause is concerned whether it is vessels or railroad cars that are
moving in interstate commerce."); Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. at
300 (affirming that "neither the Commerce Clause nor the Fourteenth Amend-
ment affords.., constitutional immunity" against taxation in either the domicili-
ary State or another State where situs is established).
211 Peabody Coal Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 731 S.W.2d 837, 838 (Mo. 1987).
212 Id. at 839 (quoting Northwest Airlines, 322 U.S. at 296).
213 In Steuart Transp5. Co. v. District of Columbia, Op. No. 1035 (D.C. Tax Ct.
1964), the court held that barges did not have situs in the District, noting that
"the use of the waterways of the District was habitual and continuous, but not
regular." See also Billings Transfer Corp. v. County of Davidson, 170 S.E.2d 873,
884 (N.C. 1969) ("It was incumbent upon plaintiff to show that a defined portion
of its property was operated along fixed routes and on regular schedules into,
through, and out of nondomiciliary states or was habitually situated and em-
ployed in other states throughout the tax year."). In Jet Fleet Corp. v. Dallas County
Appraisal District, 773 S.W. 2d 744 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), the court held that char-
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In fact, this is precisely where the line has been drawn by the
laws of most States. State laws generally require apportionment
in the case of an airline company.214 All other aircraft, includ-
ing charter aircraft and Part 91 aircraft, are typically subject to
property tax only in the State where the aircraft is based.215
3. The Commerce Clause and the "Taxable Momenit"
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Complete Auto Transit,
there were several different points of view regarding the taxabil-
ity of instrumentalities of interstate commerce. In cases such as
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, the Court expressed the
philosophy that interstate commerce could be made to pay it's
own way.216 In other cases, the Court indicated that there were
limits on the ability of the States to tax the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce. In Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky,217 the
Court ruled that a fuel tax was an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce, observing that:
ter aircraft had not acquired a situs outside of Texas where the aircraft was
parked and maintained more than 80% of the time in Texas and more than 50%
of the fuel was purchased in Texas.
214 See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 1150 et seq. (West 2001) (provides for
apportionment of value of "aircraft operated by an air carrier or foreign air car-
rier engaged in air transportation"); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-5-1301 et seq.
(Michie 2001) (provides for apportionment of value of property of
"[c]ommercial air carrier companies holding a certificate of convenience and
necessity from the comptroller, civil aeronautics board, federal aviation adminis-
tration or any other federal or state regulatory agency excepting those companies
whose operations are solely chartered operations."); WASHl REV. CODE
§§ 84.12.200 et seq. (West 2001) (provides for apportionment of value of property
of an "airplane company" "engaged in the business of transporting persons and/
or property for compensation"). The apportionment process is generally han-
dled at the State level, rather than the local level.
215 As a practical matter, most States have a vested interest in not trying to tax
non-resident aircraft. The only way to tax non-resident aircraft would be to lower
the "situs" bar. Although a lower bar might allow the States to tax more non-
resident aircraft, it would also allow more resident aircraft to qualify for appor-
tionment. At best, the States would have to do a lot more work simply to get to
the same result. But the more likely answer is that, given the relative resources of
the local governments and taxpayers the States would end up losing more than
they gained.
By way of comparison, in States where the laws have been amended to allow
apportionment of resident charter or business aircraft, such as Missouri, Nevada
and Texas, the tax authorities have become more aggressive in attempting to tax
non-resident aircraft.
216 Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938).
217 Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929).
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The tax is exacted as the price of the privilege of using an instru-
mentality of interstate commerce. It reasonably cannot be distin-
guished from a tax for using a locomotive or a car employed in
such commerce. A tax laid upon the use of the ferryboat would
present an exact parallel. And is not the fuel consumed in pro-
pelling the boat an instrumentality of commerce no less than the
boat itself? A tax which falls directly upon the use of one of the
means by which commerce is carried on directly burdens that
commerce. If a tax cannot be laid by a state upon the interstate
transportation of the subjects of commerce, as this Court defi-
nitely has held, it is little more than repetition to say that such a
tax cannot be laid upon the use of a medium by which such
transportation is effected.2"'
This same kind of sentiment was expressed in a number of other
decisions.2
19
Although these cases indicated that the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce were exempt from tax, other decisions in-
dicated that these instrumentalities could be taxed if there was a
"taxable moment" where they were not engaged in interstate
commerce. For example, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, the
court held that railroad rolling stock could be taxed if there was
a "taxable moment" where the instrumentality was not in inter-
state commerce.
220
In 1969, the Maryland Court of Appeals held in WK Grace &
Co. v. Comptroller that the Commerce Clause prohibited the im-
position of Maryland use tax on two business aircraft which were
owned by a Maryland-based business, but used exclusively in in-
terstate commerce. 221 In that case, W. R. Grace had taken deliv-
ery of both aircraft outside of Maryland and, thereafter, the
aircraft were used "regularly and exclusively in transporting
property and passengers, primarily executives and customers of
Grace, across state lines and national boundaries to various
Grace plants throughout the continent. '2 22 The court quoted
from the decision of the Supreme Court in Michigan-Wisconsin
Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, "It is now well settled that a tax imposed
218 Id. at 252.
2111 See, e.g., Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954);
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946); Cooney v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co., 294 U.S. 384 (1935). See also Spector Motor Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602
(1951) (holding that a State could not impose a privilege tax on any portion of
the income of a corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce).
220 Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167, 177 (1939).
221 W. R. Grace & Co. v. Comptroller, 258 A.2d 740 (Md. 1969).
221 Id. at 742 (quoting from the opinion of the lower court).
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on a local activity related to interstate commerce is valid if, and
only if, the local activity is not such an integral part of the inter-
state process, the flow of commerce, that it cannot realistically
be separated from it."221
The court recognized that in Southern Pacific Co., the Supreme
Court had previously upheld the imposition of a California use
tax on railroad rolling stock, stating that, "We think there was a
taxable moment when the former had reached the end of their
interstate transportation and had not begun to be consumed in
interstate operation. '"224 However, the Maryland Court con-
cluded that, in this case, there was not a "taxable moment" and
that the Maryland use tax could not be imposed.
Not surprisingly, this same issue was raised in several more
States over the next eight years. However, in all of those cases,
the courts either disagreed with the Maryland Court or were
able to find that a "taxable moment" had occurred which re-
moved the aircraft from the protection of the Commerce
Clause.225
4. Complete Auto Transit
In Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, the Supreme Court was asked
to review the constitutionality of a Mississippi privilege tax on a
company engaged in the business of transporting motor vehicles
by motor carrier for General Motors Corporation.226
The Court held that the Commerce Clause did not prohibit
imposition of a privilege on an interstate business, rejecting
their prior decision in Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, which
had held to the contrary. 227 In reaching this conclusion, the
223 Id. at 745 (quoting Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U. S.
at 166).
224 Id. (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. at 177) (emphasis
added).
225 See, e.g., Aspen Airways, Inc. v. Heckers, 499 P.2d 636 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972);
Sundstrand Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 339 N.E.2d 351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976); In re
Protest of Woods Corp., 531 P.2d 1381 (Okla. 1975) (also holding that the air-
craft had not become an instrumentality of interstate commerce); Vector Co.,
Inc. v. Benson, 491 S.W.2d 612 (Tenn. 1973).
Interestingly, the only court to agree with the Maryland court was the Missouri
Supreme Court, in Director of Revenue v. L&L Marine Service, Inc., 647 S.W.2d 524
(Mo. 1983), which was decided six years after Complete Auto Transit and did not
mention either case. Four years later, the Missouri Supreme Court, in Director of
Revenue v. Superior Aircraft Leasing Co., 734 S.W.2d 504 (Mo. 1987), overruled this
decision, relying on Complete Auto Transit.
226 Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
227 Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
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Court reviewed their prior decisions and concluded that these
decisions:
have considered not the formal language of the tax statute but
rather its practical effect, and have sustained a tax against Com-
merce Clause challenge when the tax [1] is applied to an activity
with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly appor-
tioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate commerce,
and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.221
This four-part test later became known as the "Complete Auto
Transit Test" and has been used to determine the constitutional-
ity of various State taxing schemes, including State sales and use
taxes, 229 State property taxes, 230 and State income taxes. 23 ' The
Court has also made certain refinements to the test, none of
which appear to have application to the present analysis.232
The decision in Complete Auto Transit has had several impor-
tant consequences relating to the taxation of aircraft and other
instrumentalities of interstate commerce. First, this case marked
the end to the notion that the Commerce Clause prohibits the
taxation of aircraft and other instrumentalities of interstate
commerce. Such instrumentalities can be made to pay their
own way. Second, the decision effectively caused the Commerce
Clause to assume a dominant role in determining the taxability
of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. In prior deci-
sions, the Due Process Clause had been viewed as setting the
minimum requirements which a State had to meet in order to
tax the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. However, the
decision effectively merged the Due Process requirements into
the Commerce Clause requirements. 233
228 Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279 (bracketed numbers added).
229 See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175
(1995); Assoc. Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 647 (1994); D. H. Holmes Co.
v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24 (1988).
230 See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
231 See, e.g., Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U. S. 159 (1983);
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't
of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
232 See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979),
where the court added two additional requirements to be met where foreign
commerce is involved. Fractional programs typically do not involve foreign com-
merce. See also D. H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24 (1988), and
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995) (elaborating
on the meaning of the fair apportionment requirement).
233 As was pointed out in Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 313 (1992), "a
corporation may have the "minimum contacts" with a taxing State as required by
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5. Treatment of Resident and Nonresident Aircraft
Following W.R. Grace, a number of aircraft owners argued that
the Commerce Clause prohibited the State from imposing use
tax, even where the aircraft was based in the State (a "resident
aircraft").234 The decision in Complete Auto Transit effectively
eliminated the argument that the Commerce Clause protects a
"resident aircraft" from tax. However, the case provided greater
protection against taxation of "nonresident aircraft." This is be-
cause, in order to tax a nonresident aircraft, the State must be
able to show that the aircraft has a "substantial nexus" with the
State and that the tax is fairly related to the services provided by
the State.
The meaning of the term "substantial nexus" is unclear. In
Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that the
occasional use of company trucks to make deliveries into the
State was not enough to create nexus.23 5 In Director of Revenue v.
Superior Aircraft Leasing Co.,236 the Missouri Supreme Court held
that use tax could be imposed on a non-resident aircraft which
was used 17% of the time in Missouri:
Here, even though the plane was hangared and repairs, if
needed, were made in Dayton, Ohio, there were contacts with
Missouri sufficient to create a substantial nexus. During the pe-
riod April 2, 1980, through September 1981, 17.7 percent of the
total flight hours were logged on flights to Missouri solely for
Superior Aircraft's business. All of these flights, with the excep-
tion of one for inspecting a construction site, were recorded as
being for board meetings of Superior Aircraft. The time spent in
Missouri for each of those trips ranged from several days to ap-
proximately a week.23 7
Despite the court's conclusion, it is possible that something
more than a 17% presence should required to meet the "sub-
stantial nexus" requirement. The continued vitality of the "si-
tus" requirement indicates that an argument can be made that
the Due Process Clause, and yet lack the 'substantial nexus' with that State as
required by the Commerce Clause."
234 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 223. The Due Process Clause does not pro-
tect a resident from tax. See, e.g., Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340
(1954).
235 Miller Bros Co., 347 U.S. 340.
236 Dir. of Revenue v. Superior Aircraft Leasing Co., 734 S.W.2d 504 (Mo.
1987).
237 Id. at 507. See also Frank W. Whitcomb Constr. Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes,
479 A.2d 164, 165-66 (Vt. 1984) (taxpayer conceded that using the aircraft 17%
in the State was enough to justify imposition of a use tax).
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"substantial nexus" is the same as "situs." If so, then a 17% pres-
ence would not be enough.
6. Treatment of Leased Property Temporarily Located in the State
In Itel Containers International Corp. v. Huddleston, the Supreme
Court held that the delivery of property to a lessee in the State
was a sufficient basis to justify the imposition of State sales tax
on all of the lease payments, even though the property was sub-
sequently used entirely outside of the State. 23" However, where
the property is not delivered to the lessee in the State, but is
merely used in the State, the courts have held that Constitution
may bar imposition of the tax.
In Marx v. Leasing Association, Inc., the Mississippi Supreme
Court held that a lessor could not be required to pay sales tax
where the lessor had not "operated business facilities within the
state, domiciled equipment within the state, stationed employ-
ees within the state, or entered into leasing agreements within
the state. ' 239 To the contrary, the court observed that: "The
only apparent connections with Mississippi are that each corpo-
ration is qualified to do business within the state and their
equipment on occasion passes through the state via the highway
systems. ' 24 0 The court upheld the finding of the lower court
that "no sufficient nexus existed to justify the tax sought to be
imposed by Mississippi," observing that:
While it is true that the term "minimal connection" is employed
in the test articulated by the Supreme Court, subsequent inter-
pretations have noted that the corporation must "substantially"
avail itself to the privilege of doing business in the taxing State.
Such language certainly would appear to contemplate greater ac-
tivities than those present in this case.24 1
The court also held that the tax violated the other three parts
of the Complete Auto Transit test. The court had difficulty deter-
mining whether the "fair apportionment" and "non-discrimina-
tion" tests had been met because the State had not come up
with a clear method of apportioning the lease payments to the
State. The court also held that the tax violated the "services pro-
vided" test, stating that:
238 Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60 (1993).
239 Marx v. Leasing Assoc., Inc., 520 So.2d 1333, 1343 (Miss. 1987).
240 Id.
241 Id. (emphasis in original).
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In the present case, unlike Complete Auto Transit, the services pro-
vided by Mississippi to Ryder and Saunders are minimal. In Com-
plete Auto Transit, the taxpayer stored trucks in Mississippi which
were then used to pick up and carry shipments of new cars to
Mississippi auto dealers. In that case, Mississippi provided sub-
stantial services to the taxpayer because it protected its property,
its employees, and because Complete Auto Transit consistently used
the highways of Mississippi to conduct its business. In the pre-
sent case, neither Ryder nor Saunders have equipment here and
do not consistently utilize the Mississippi highways. In fact, they
have no control over which highways the lessees of their vehicles
use once those vehicles are leased.242
In Cally Curtis Co. v. Commissioner, the Connecticut Supreme
Court held that sales tax could not be applied to the rental of
video tapes in the State by an out-of-state lessor.243 Interestingly,
the court considered only whether the imposition of the tax vio-
lated the Due Process Clause and did not consider the applica-
tion of the Commerce Clause. This decision indicates that the
activity would not have met either the "substantial nexus" or the
"services provided" requirement of Complete Auto Transit
In short, just because Curtis leased instead of sold the films in
Connecticut, does not mean that Curtis "'receiv[ed] benefits
from [Connecticut] for which [Connecticut] has the power to
exact a price.' Although Curtis did have property (films) within
Connecticut, such contact with Connecticut, like the contact of
the appellant's delivery trucks with Maryland in Miller Brothers Co.
v. Maryland, supra, was de minimus, as the films were only in the
State for three-day periods, and did not benefit from the services
of local government. '44
242 Id. at 1345.
243 Cally Curtis Co. v. Comm'r, 572 A.2d 302 (Conn. 1990).
244 Id. at 306 (citations omitted).
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V. STATE SALES AND USE TAX
A. THE GENERAL RULES
1. The Sales and Use Tax
The States first enacted sales and use taxes during the Depres-
sion of the 1930s as a means of raising revenues. 245 Today, al-
most every State imposes some kind of sales and use tax.246
The sales tax is a one-time tax imposed on the sale at retail of
tangible personal property within the State. The tax is a per-
centage of the sales price, and ranges from less than 2% to over
8%.247 The tax may be characterized as an excise tax on the sale
or as a privilege tax on the seller.248 There are a number of
exclusions and exemptions from tax. 249 One of the most impor-
tant exclusions is the "resale exclusion," which is intended to
insure that the tax is imposed only on the final sale at retail. In
contrast with an exemption, an exclusion is broadly construed
in favor of the taxpayer.250 Many States have exclusions and ex-
emptions which apply to aircraft, but these vary widely from
State to State.
Because sales tax can easily be avoided by taking delivery of
the property outside of the State, most States with a sales tax
have also adopted a use tax to serve as a backstop. 25' The use
245 Lockwood v. Nims, 98 N.W.2d 753, 754 (Mich. 1959) ("The sales tax came
to us in the depth of a great depression in order to provide the means for fulfil-
ling desperate governmental needs.").
246 The only States which do not presently have some kind of sales tax are
Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon.
247 The Delaware tax on retailers is .75%. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 2905(b) (1)
(2001). Some local jurisdictions in California, New York and Texas have rates in
excess of 8%. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 6901 (West 2002).
248 See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6051 (West 2002) ("For the privilege of
selling tangible personal property at retail ..."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 2905
(2001) ("retailer license requirements"); and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-2 (Michie
2002).
249 See, e.g., Finch, Pruyn & Co. v. Tully, 419 N.Y.S.2d 232 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979)
("[a]lthough exemptions from taxation must be construed against the taxpayer,
the reverse is true when the inquiry is directed at whether the property is subject
to any tax whatever").
250 See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State Comm'n of Revenue & Taxa-
tion, 212 P.2d 363, 367 (Kan. 1949) ("There is one basic principle about our sales
tax act. It is that the ultimate consumer should pay the tax and no article should
have to carry more than one sales tax.").
251 See, e.g., Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 44 N.W.2d 449, 452
(Iowa 1950) ("[t]he principal purpose of the use-tax law was to remedy the evil of
out-of-state buying to escape the sales tax"); UPS v. Armold, 542 P.2d 694, 697
(Kan. 1975) ("A problem arose, however, with the realization that property could
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tax is generally imposed on the privilege of using property in
the State. The use tax generally has the same exclusions, ex-
emptions, and tax rates as the sales tax. The Supreme Court has
held that a State cannot impose a use tax which discriminates
against an out-of-state purchaser.252 In order to avoid double-
taxation, the States generally allow a credit for taxes paid to
other States.253 The Supreme Court has indicated that, in the
absence of apportionment, such a credit is required.254
The taxation of leases has evolved. Many States originally
took the position that the lessor was the consumer of the prop-
erty and that sales or use tax should be imposed when the prop-
erty was sold to or used by the lessor.255 While a few States still
take this position, most States now consider the lease to be the
be purchased outside the state and subsequently brought into the state, thereby
avoiding the general sales tax. To rectify this situation, numerous state legisla-
tures enacted compensating tax laws to impose a tax on the sales of property
purchased beyond their borders which otherwise would be subject to the sales
tax.").
252 Assoc. Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641 (1994) (State cannot impose
a higher use tax rate on property purchased from out-of-state vendor); Hallibur-
ton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64 (1963) (isolated sale exemption
and taxable basis of self-constructed property).
253 See, e.g., CALIF. RiEv. & TAX. CODE § 6406 (West 2002); N.Y. TAx LAW
§ 1118(7) (Consol. 2002).
254 See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 192 n.6
(1995) (citations omitted):
Although we have not held that a State imposing an apportioned
gross receipts tax that grants a credit for sales taxes paid in-state
must also extend such a credit to sales taxes paid out-of-state, we
have noted that equality of treatment of interstate and intrastate
activity has been the common theme among the paired (or "com-
pensating") tax schemes that have passed constitutional muster.
We have indeed never upheld a tax in the face of a substantiated
charge that it provided credits for the taxpayer's payment of in-
state taxes but failed to extend such credit to payment of equivalent
out-of-state taxes. To the contrary, in upholding tax schemes pro-
viding credits for taxes paid in-state and occasioned by the same
transaction, we have often pointed to the concomitant credit provi-
sions for taxes paid out-of-state as supporting our conclusion that a
particular tax passed muster because it treated out-of-state and in-
state taxpayers alike. A general requirement of equal treatment is
thus amply clear from our precedent. We express no opinion on
the need for equal treatment when a credit is allowed for payment
of in-or out-of-state taxes by a third party.
255 See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 386 P.2d 496 (Cal.
1963); Philco Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 239 N.E.2d 805 (Ill. 1968); Cedar Valley
Leasing, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Rev., 274 N.W.2d 357 (Iowa 1979); Commercial
Leasing, Inc. v. Johnson, 197 A. 2d 323 (Me. 1964). See also IBM v. State Tax
Comm'n, 362 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1962) (rentals not taxable as sales).
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sale at retail and impose tax on the lease payments. 25 6 Where
the lessor purchases the property exclusively for lease, the sale
to the lessor will generally be considered a nontaxable sale for
resale.257
As a general rule, sales tax is not imposed on transportation
services. 258 The transportation provider is considered the con-
sumer of any tangible property used to provide those services.
In the absence of a special exemption (such as the "common
carrier" exemption), sales or use tax will be imposed when the
property is sold to or used by the provider.259
a. Lease vs. Transportation Service
Because of the difference in the taxation of leases and trans-
portation services, the distinction between a lease and a trans-
portation service is important. In defining a lease, the States
generally use the same common law test which is used for other
tax purposes. 26° For example, the rental of property without an
operator is generally considered a lease while the rental of prop-
erty with an operator will generally be a service, particularly
256 The two most notable "holdouts" are Illinois and Maine. See, e.g., ILL. AD-
MIN. CODE tit. 86, § 130.220(a) (2002) ("Effective August 1, 1967, the sale of tan-
gible personal property to a purchaser who will act as a lessor of such tangible
personal property is a sale at retail and is subject to Retailers' Occupation Tax.");
James A. Dowling v. State Tax Assessor, 478 A.2d 1123 (Me. 1984) (Resale exemp-
tion not applicable where property purchased for lease.). California still treats
the lessor of "mobile transportation equipment" (including aircraft) as the user,
but allows the lessor to elect to pay tax on the lease payments. See CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 18, § 1661 (2002).
257 See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12A-1.007(14)(b)(1) (2002) ("The
purchase of an aircraft, boat, mobile home, or motor vehicle exclusively for
rental purposes may be made tax exempt when the purchaser/lessor issues a
resale certificate to the dealer at the time of purchase in lieu of paying tax. The
lessor shall collect tax from his customers on the total rental charge."); 34 TEx.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.2940)(1) (Vernon 2000) ("The purchaser of property which is
to be held for lease within the United States of America, its territories and posses-
sions, or within the United Mexican States may issue a resale certificate in lieu of
the sales tax or use tax at the time of purchase.")
258 See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 12A-1.071(10) (2002).
25) See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 458-20-178 (2002) ("[a] lessor who leases
equipment with an operator is deemed a user and is liable for the tax on the full
value of the equipment.")
260) See, e.g., Duncan Crane Serv., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 723 P.2d 480 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1986) holding that a regulation which ignored the common law test was
invalid ("the drafters of the regulation were unconcerned with whether the par-
ties to the rental agreement had arranged what the common law recognizes as a
lease").
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where the operator remains under the control of the lessor.211
Where the lessee obtains the property and operators from dif-
ferent unrelated sources, the rental of the property would pre-
sumably be considered a lease. This appears to be the same
kind of test that is used by the FAA to distinguish between a "wet
lease" and a "dry lease."
b. Tax Ownership of the Property
Determining the tax owner of property is also important for
sales and use tax purposes. A change in tax ownership is neces-
sary to trigger application of the sales tax, and only the tax
owner is subject to use tax and entitled to claim certain
exemptions.
In general, the sales tax laws provide that a sale includes a
transfer of "title and possession. ''262 However, where the transac-
tion is ambiguous, the States tend to consider the same factors
that are considered for income tax purposes, such as who has
the burdens and benefits of ownership. These factors have been
used to determine the location of the sale, whether a lease is an
operating lease or a financing lease, and whether a sale-lease-
back transaction is really a loan.263 In most cases, the same per-
261 See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12A-1.071(d) (2002) ("When the owner
of equipment furnishes the operator and all operating supplies, and contracts for
their use to perform certain work under his direction and according to his cus-
tomer's specifications, and the customer does not take possession or have any
direction or control over the physical operation, the contract constitutes a service
transaction and not the rental of tangible personal property and no tax is due on
the transaction."); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20 § 5 4 1.2(p)(2) (2002)
("when a rental, lease or license to use a vehicle or equipment includes the ser-
vices of a driver or operator, such transaction is presumptively the sale of a ser-
vice, rather than the rental of tangible personal property, where dominion and
control over the vehicle or equipment remain with the owner or lessor of the
vehicle or equipment.").
262 See, e.g., CAL. REV. & Tax. Code § 6006 (West 2002) ("'Sale' means and
includes: (a) Any transfer of title or possession . .. of tangible personal property
for a consideration."); FLA. SrAT. ANN. § 212(15) (West 2001) ("Sale" means and
includes: (a) Any transfer of title or possession, or both . . . of tangible personal
property for a consideration."); N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(5) (McKinney 2000)
(Sale, selling or purchase. Any transfer of title or possession or both . . . for a
consideration"); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.005 (Vernon 2002) ("'Sale' or
'purchase' means any of the following when done or performed for considera-
tion: (1) a transfer of title or possession of tangible personal property . . .").
263 See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12A-1.071(1) (d) (2002) ("Where a con-
tract designated as a lease transfers substantially all the benefits, including depre-
ciation, and risks inherent in the ownership of tangible personal property to the
lessee, and ownership of the property transfers to the lessee at the end of the
lease term, or the contract contains a purchase option for a nominal amount, the
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son is the tax owner for both the income tax and the sales and
use tax.264
2. Taxation of Purchase and Use of Own Aircraft
The sales tax on aircraft is easily avoided because the sales tax
applies only if the aircraft is delivered to the purchaser in the
State. This means that the purchaser has the option of choosing
the State in which the sale takes place. The purchaser can take
delivery in a State which does not have a sales tax or which ex-
empts or limits the sales tax on aircraft.265 Alternatively, the pur-
chaser can take delivery in a State which has a "fly away"
exemption, which generally allows a nonresident to avoid paying
sales tax where the aircraft is immediately removed from the
State.26 6
The use tax is more difficult to avoid. If the aircraft is based
and primarily used outside of the State by a nonresident, the
Constitutional limitations discussed above may prevent imposi-
tion of the use tax. In addition, many States have specific rules
which limit the tax on non-resident aircraft. Some States ex-
empt aircraft which are based and primarily used outside of the
State. 267 Some States do not tax aircraft which are not used in
the State for the requisite number of days. 268 Finally, under the
rationale that the use tax was intended only to backstop the sales
tax, many States impose use tax only on property "purchased for
use" in the State.269
Where the aircraft is based or primarily used in the State or
where the owner is a resident, the use tax will generally apply.
The only way to avoid imposition of the tax is to find a state-
contract shall be regarded as a sale of tangible personal property under a security
agreement (commonly referred to as a capital lease, sales-type lease, or direct
financing lease) from its inception.").
264 See, e.g., Northrop Corporation v. State Board of Equalization, 110 CA3d
132 (Calif. Ct. App., Sept. 10, 1980) (The court followed the IRS income tax
characterization of a transaction for sales tax purposes.).
265 See., e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-412(99) (2001) (exemption for aircraft hav-
ing a maximum certificated takeoff weight of 6,000 lbs. or more); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 105-164.4(a)(1b) (2002) (maximum tax on aircraft is $1,500); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 12-36-2110(A) (1) (2001) (maximum tax on aircraft is $300).
266 See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6366(a)(1) (West 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 212.05(2) (West 2001); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.328(a) (4) (Vernon 2002).
267 See, e.g., 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.297(c) (3) (West 2002).
268 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3704(a) (2001); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 5.1-5, 58.1-
1502 (Michie 2002).
269 See, e.g., CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 6201 (West 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 212.05 (West 2001); TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.101 (Vernon 2002).
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defined exclusion or exemption from tax. This can prove diffi-
cult. For example, although most States have a "commercial
use" exemption, there are only a few States where this exemp-
tion applies to aircraft operated under Part 91.270
The use of a management company should not change this
result, particularly where the owner retains operational control
of the aircraft. For example, in New York Times Co. v. Comm'r, the
Board considered the taxability of an arrangement where an air-
craft was leased by the New York Times ("Times") from a wholly
owned subsidiary.2 7 ' The Times contracted with AFM, an unre-
lated company, to provide pilot and management services. AFM
also instituted an interchange program in which the Times par-
ticipated. Although the Times argued that the aircraft had ef-
fectively been sold to AFM, the Board held otherwise. The
Board noted that "the distinction between a [taxable] lease or
rental and a service that requires use of property by the service
provider can be difficult to draw. '272 However, the Board was
aware that the arrangement was designed to allow the aircraft to
be operated under Part 91, observing that the Times "retained
as much control over the aircraft as was compatible with theFAA regulatory regime.''273 The Board concluded that AFM was
"a transportation service provider operating and maintaining
aircraft Appellant controlled" and that "the interchange agree-
ment did not confer greater control of the aircraft on A.F.M.
'
"274
These conclusions were apparently not contested when the case
was appealed to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,
which affirmed the decision of the Board that the aircraft was
subject to use tax.275
3. Taxation of Joint Ownership Arrangements
The sale or use of an undivided interest in an aircraft appears
to be taxable in the same way as the sale or use of a whole air-
270 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., TAx-GEN. § 11-208(c)(1) (2001) (exempts aircraft
"used principally to cross State lines in interstate or foreign commerce"); Pas-
quale & Bowers, Op. N.Y. Comm'r Tax & Fin. TSB-A-96(49)S (1996).
271 NewYork Times Co. v. Comm'r, Mass. App. Tax Bd., Dkt. No. F214442 (July
8, 1997), affd 693 N.E.2d 682 (Mass. 1998).
272 Id. (quoting JOSEPH X. DONOVAN, THE MASSACHUSETTS SALES AND USE TAX
MANUAL REVISED 169-70 (1995)).
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 New York Times Co. v. Comm'r, 693 N.E.2d 682 (Mass. 1998).
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craft. 276 However, where the owners are residents of different
States, the taxation of the different interests could vary. For ex-
ample, if an interest owner is a resident of the State where the
aircraft is used, the owner may not be able to take advantage of
an exemption for aircraft owned by a nonresident which are
based and primarily used outside of the State.
4. Taxation of Dry Lease Exchange
The dry lease exchange should have a significant impact on
the sales and use tax consequences to the participants. This is
because, in most States, property which is purchased and used
exclusively for lease to others is exempt from sales and use tax
under the resale exclusion.
The fact that the lease takes the form of a barter should not
change this result. Most, if not all, State sales tax laws provide
that barter transactions are subject to tax. 277 This is consistent
with the State sales and use tax objective of insuring that the
sales or use tax is imposed on the final consumer.278
The fact that the interest owner may use his own aircraft
should not violate the requirement that the property be pur-
chased and used "exclusively for lease" since any access to the
aircraft is pursuant to the fractional agreements and not pursu-
ant to a retained right.27
9
In recent years, many States have added a requirement that,
in order to take advantage of the resale exclusion, the lessor
276 See, e.g., ILL. GEN. INFO. LEi-FER ST 94-0392 (1994) (dealer selling half inter-
est in aircraft to another dealer).
277 See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 18, § 1654 (2002). Barter, Exchange, Trade-Ins
and Foreign Currency Transactions, FLA. STAr. ANN. § 212(15) (West 2001)
("Sale" means and includes: (a) Any transfer of title or possession, or both, ex-
change, barter, license, lease, or rental, conditional or otherwise, in any manner
or by any means whatsoever, of tangible personal property for a consideration.");
N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(5) (McKinney 2000) (Sale, selling or purchase. Any
transfer of title or possession or both, exchange or barter, rental, lease or license
to use or consume . .. for a consideration"); TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.005
(Vernon 2002) ("'Sale' or 'purchase' means any of the following when done or
performed for consideration: . . . (2) the exchange, barter, lease, or rental of
tangible personal property;").
V8 As can be seen, the treatment of barter exchanges can vary depending on
the type of tax involved. Excise taxes, such as the transportation tax and the sales
tax, tend to tax particular types of transactions, including barter exchanges,
whereas an income tax will apply only if there is a net "accretion to wealth."
279 Although the interest owner can request to fly in his own aircraft, the pro-
gram manager generally has the unfettered right to substitute another aircraft.
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must be registered to collect tax in the State. 28 0 However, a re-
view of these requirements generally reveals that they were in-
tended only to prevent in-State purchasers from unlawfully
evading the sales tax.2 1 They were not intended to prevent out-
of-State purchasers from lawfully claiming exemption from use
tax where the property is later brought into the State. If these
requirements also applied for use tax purposes, then, in opera-
tion, they would result in unlawful discrimination against out-of-
State purchasers.28 2
As a general rule, the lease payments are subject to tax only in
the State where the aircraft is based. For example, in Huntington
Leasing Co. v. Lindley, the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals, held that
sales tax was not applicable to lease payments for an aircraft
which merely entered Ohio from time to time, when necessary
during the usual course of the lessee's business.2 3 The only
connection that the aircraft had to Ohio was that the lease
agreement was executed in Ohio and the aircraft was registered
in Ohio. Possession of the aircraft was transferred outside of
Ohio and the aircraft was continuously based outside of Ohio.28 4
Even in the States where tax is imposed on the lessor, there
may be limitations which prevent the imposition of tax on air-
craft which are based outside of the State. For example, in
Realco Services, Inc. v. Halperin, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine held that the use tax did not apply to the rental of piggy-
back trailers in the State.2 ' Realco Services operated the Na-
280 See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12A-1.071(2) (a) (1) (2002) ("Tangible
personal property purchased exclusively for leasing purposes may be purchased
tax exempt, providing the lessor is registered with the Department as a dealer at the time of
purchase and issues the vendor a valid resale certificate in lieu of tax. Any
purchases made prior to the time of registration as a dealer are subject to tax."
(emphasis added).
281 These unscrupulous purchasers could be: (1) nonresidents who depart the
taxing jurisdiction; or (2) residents who hope that they won't get caught in a use
tax audit.
282 See, e.g., Assoc. Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641 (1994); Halliburton
Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64 (1963).
283 Huntington Leasing Co. v. Lindley, Ohio BTA, Case No. 82-A-1407 (Feb.
19, 1986).
284 There are, of course, exceptions to this rule. Some States where aircraft are
based allow an exclusion for out of State use. See, e.g., N.M. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 3,
§ 3.2.1.17(D), "Multistate Use of Leased Equipment." Conversely, some States
will attempt to tax all of the lease payments on aircraft delivered to the lessee in
the State, regardless of where the aircraft is based. See, e.g., Itel Containers Int'l
Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60 (1993) where Tennessee successfully took this
position.
285 Realco Services, Inc. v. Halperin, 355 A.2d 743 (1976).
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tional Railroad Trailer Pool (Pool), with which most of the
major railroads in the United States and Canada are affiliated by
contract. Realco purchased "piggyback trailers" and placed
them in circulation for the benefit of all members of the Pool.
In prior cases, the court had held that "mere receipt of rentals
was not a sufficient exercise of right or power over tangible per-
sonal property to subject a non-resident lessor to the obligation
to pay a use tax thereon."2 6 In response, the Maine Legislature
broadened the definition of use to include the "derivation of
income by a lessor in the form of rental provided, however, that
the 'tangible personal property' [was] located in this state. .,"97
The court in Realco Services reviewed this history and con-
cluded that "it seems self-evident that the Legislature intended
the words "located in this State" to relate to personal property
which, in fact, had come to rest within the State with a corre-
sponding loss of all transient characteristics. '28 Since the piggy-
back trailers did not meet this requirement, the court held that
Realco was not subject to use tax on the trailers.
B. CHARACTERIZATION OF FRACTIONAL PROGRAMS
To date, the only States to address the sales tax characteriza-
tion of fractional programs are New York and Texas.
1. The New York Ruling
In The Gap, Inc., the New York Commissioner of Taxation and
Finance ruled that a fractional program is a non-taxable trans-
portation service . 9 The ruling was requested by the fractional
customer ("Petitioner"). The basis for this conclusion is un-
clear. Although the facts in the ruling indicate that the selling
company (referred to as "Seller") and the management com-
pany (referred to as "Manager") were separate legal entities, the
Commissioner appeared to ignore these separate legal entities.
286 Id. at 746. See generally Automatic Canteen Co. v. Johnson, 190 A.2d 734
(Me. 1963) (use tax on non-resident lessor upheld where lessor inspected, main-
tained and repaired the property in the State); South Shoe Mach. Co. v. Johnson,
188 A.2d 353 (Me. 1963) (no use tax on property from non-resident lessor who
had no other connection with the State); Trimount Coin Mach. Co. v. Johnson,
124 A.2d 753 (Me. 1956) (no tax on leased exclusively for use Maine from non-
resident lessor).
287 Id. at 746.
288 Jd. at 747.
289 The Gap, Inc., TSB-A-00(3)S, Adv. Op. N.Y. Comm'r Tax. & Fin. (Jan. 28,
2000).
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The Commission began by concluding that, because of the na-
ture of the fractional agreements, the aircraft was never really
sold to the interest owner:
The documents furnished by Petitioner provide that the interest
in the aircraft conveyed by Seller to each owner is subject to the
rights of each of the other additional interest owners. All of the
owners of an interest in the aircraft have entered into the Master
interchange agreement with Manager, whereby another aircraft
may be substituted by Manager if the aircraft in which Petitioner
purchases an interest is not available. When the aircraft is not in
use by one of the owners, Manager retains the right to use it.
These arrangements among each of the owners and between
each owner and Manager significantly limits the control any sin-
gle owner may exercise over the aircraft. Therefore, the interest that
will be conveyed to Petitioner by the "bill of sale" is not the transfer of
possession of tangible personal property and the word "owner" as used in
the context of the agreements does not denote ownership in the typical
sense which involves the holding of title to property.290
The Commissioner then indicated that the question was
whether the transaction constituted a lease or a service, citing
N.Y. St. Reg. 526.7(e), relating to a "rental, lease or license to
use," and from Technical Services Bureau Memorandum enti-
fled Bus Company Transactions - Transportation Service vs. Equip-
ment Rental:291
Whether Petitioner's purchase constitutes a taxable rental of tangi-
ble personal property rather than the purchase of an exempt
transportation service turns upon the question of dominion and
control. While the provisions of TSB-M-84(7), supra, do not spe-
cifically apply to the chartering of an aircraft, the criteria set
forth therein are useful in determining whether Petitioner has
obtained dominion and control of the aircraft within the meaning
of Section 526. 7(e) of the Sales and Use Tax Regulations.29 2
While the Commissioner did not identify the lessor of the air-
craft, the Commissioner appeared to focus solely on the role of
the management company in making this determination:
In Petitioner's case, the management agreement provides that
Manager will furnish qualified pilots to operate the aircraft. The
290 Id. (emphasis added).
291 Bus Co. Transactions - Transp. Serv. vs. Equipment Rental, TSB-M-84(7)S,
Adv. Op. N.Y. Comm'r Tax. & Fin. (Apr. 10, 1984). This kind of analysis would
have made more sense if the selling company and the management company
were the same legal entity. However, the facts indicate that they were not.
292 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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pilots are paid by Manager, who also provides, at its own expense,
recurrent pilot training, pilot medical examinations and
uniforms. In some instances a pilot may be chosen by Petitioner
but only subject to the approval of Manager. While Petitioner
will select the date, time, point of departure and destination with
regard to a particular flight, Manager makes all necessary take-
off, flight and landing arrangements, and the pilots use their own
discretion in performing the flight services and select their own
routes. Manager has the overall responsibility to manage and op-
erate the aircraft and pays all operating expenses such as fuel,
hangar and general storage fees, flight planning and weather ser-
vices and aircraft hull insurance (which names Manager and all
owners as insureds and provides for any insurance proceeds to be
paid to Manager for repair or replacement of the aircraft).293
Having made these observations, the Commissioner appeared
to conclude that the interest owner had relinquished control to
the management company:
In its purchase of an interest in the aircraft for the purpose of
transportation of its officials, employees and guests, Petitioner
has fulfilled none of the requirements listed in TSB-M-84(7)S,
supra, necessary to retain dominion and control over the
aircraft.294
But, in the very next sentence, the Commissioner appears to
return to the original premise, concluding that there never was
a sale of the aircraft to the interest owner:
Some additional factors set forth in the agreements which sup-
port the view that sufficient custody over the aircraft along with
the right to exercise the necessary direction and control have not
been transferred to Petitioner for there to be a retail sale of such aircraft
are:
1. Manager arranges for the aircraft to be inspected, main-
tained, serviced, repaired, overhauled and tested in accor-
dance with approved Federal Aviation Administration
standards and guidelines.
2. Manager maintains all records, logs and other materials re-
quired by the FAA to be maintained in respect to the aircraft.
3. Manager retains the right to use the aircraft during periods it
is not being utilized in the transportation of Petitioner or
other owners and to retain any money it earns in this use of
the aircraft.
293 Id.
2144 Id. (emphasis added).
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4. Seller's obligations to sell the interest to Petitioner are sub-
ject to Petitioner becoming a party to the Management, Joint
Ownership and Master interchange agreements.
5. Seller has the right of first refusal to purchase Owner's inter-
est in Aircraft and may, after five years, compel Owner to sell
its interest to Seller at a repurchase price based on the then
fair market value of Aircraft.295
Finally, the Commissioner apparently tried to cover all the ba-
ses by saying that there was neither a sale nor a rental to the
interest owner:
Therefore, possession, command and control of the aircraft have
not been transferred to Petitioner, and what is being furnished
to Petitioner is a nontaxable transportation service and not a tax-
able purchase or rental of tangible personal property pursuant to
Sections 1101(b)(5) and 1105(a) of the Tax Law.29 6
As can be seen, the Commissioner also took this opportunity
to substitute the federal transportation tax "possession com-
mand and control" test for the New York "dominion and con-
trol" test and to cite a couple of federal transportation tax
rulings, which raises even further questions about the meaning
of this ruling.297
Although both Part 91 and "operational control" play a key
role in fractional programs, the Commissioner did not make any
reference to either. Nor did the Commissioner appear to give
any weight to the fact that the aircraft and the crews were ob-
tained from unrelated legal entities, i.e., the fractional owners
and the management company, respectively. All of the rulings
cited, including the IRS rulings, dealt with transactions where
the property and services were provided by the same legal
entity. 298
295 Id. (emphasis added).
296 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
297 In Rev. Rul. 76-394, 1976-2 C.B. 355, the transportation tax applied where a
company provided transportation to related companies which were not members
of the same affiliated group. In Rev. Rul. 68-343, 1968-1 C.B. 491, the transporta-
tion tax applied where a company provided transportation to participating and
related companies. In both rulings, the same company providing the transporta-
tion owned the aircraft and employed the pilots, albeit with the concurrence of
the participants.
298 In Bus Company Transactions, supra note 289, the bus and drivers were pro-
vided by the same company. In Klondike Cruises, Inc., TSB-A-98(46)S, Adv. Op.
N.Y. Comm'r Tax. & Fin. (July 29, 1998), and Henry F Geerken, TSB-A-97(52)S) ,
Adv. Op. N.Y. Comm'r Tax. & Fin. (Aug. 25, 1997), the ship and crew were pro-
vided by the same company. In Limousine Operators of Western New York. Inc., TSB-
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While the rationale for the ruling may be elusive, the result
was favorable to the interest owner. Consequently, it is unlikely
that any other interest owner will ask the Commissioner to re-
consider, even if they may disagree with the characterization of
the transaction.
Nor is it likely that the ruling will be called into question by
the fractional companies. This is because, under New York law,
an aircraft which is used primarily to provide transportation is
exempt from sales or use tax, even where the transportation is
provided under Part 91.299
2. The Texas Pronouncement
In the December 2000 issue of "Tax Policy News," the Texas
Comptroller issued a "FYI: Sales Tax," explaining the proper
treatment of fractional interests for Texas sales and use tax pur-
poses. 00 The Comptroller discussed the operation of a frac-
tional program and the four major agreements, starting with "a
purchase agreement between a sponsor and an interest
owner."301 The Comptroller stated that, "The four agreements
must be construed together, in order to determine the parties'
intent. 132 The Comptroller observed that:
While the Federal Aviation Administration has treated fractional
ownership as non-commercial transportation, the Internal Reve-
nue Service has ruled that for excise tax purposes fractional-own-
ership plans are more in the nature of a commercial
transportation service than a co-tenancy because owners have
surrendered possession, command, and control of the aircraft.3 03
Finally, the Comptroller concluded that, for sales and use tax
purposes:
Although the participant provides some direction to the pilots,
possession of the aircraft remains with the seller. In this situa-
tion, the participant is contracting for a nontaxable air charter
A-88(55)S, Adv. Op. N.Y. Comm'r Tax. & Fin. (Oct. 27, 1988), the limousines
and drivers were provided by the same company. In IRS Rev. Ruls. 76-394 and 68-
343, the plane and pilots were provided by the same company.
299 See, e.g., Pasquale and Bowers, TSB-A-96(49)S, Adv. Op. N.Y. Comm'r Tax.
& Fin. (Aug. 1, 1996); Citiflight, Inc., TSB-A-00(30)S, Adv. Op. N.Y. Comm'r Tax.
& Fin. (Sept, 11, 2000).
300 Texas State Comptroller, Tax Policy News, Vol. X, issue 8 (Dec. 2000), avail-
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service, and a taxable sale or rental of an aircraft to the partici-
pant does not occur. This is true regardless of whether the
charges for pilot or other labor are separately stated from the
charges for the aircraft. The sponsor is responsible for any tax
on the purchase of the airplane. °4
This FYI indicates that, as far as the Texas Comptroller is con-
cerned, the aircraft is never sold to the interest owner and the
selling company is responsible for the taxes on the aircraft. Un-
like the New York ruling, it is not clear whether the program
described in the FYI involved a separate selling company and
management company. As in the case of the New York ruling,
the Comptroller appeared to place greater weight on the IRS
treatment of these programs than on the FAA treatment.
3. Critique
Both the New York Ruling and the Texas Pronouncement
suggest that there is a tendency among the State tax authorities
to conclude that the interest owner is not the owner of the air-
craft, despite the language of the agreements and despite the
interest owner's assumption of the benefits and burdens of own-
ership, including risk of loss. To the extent that this conclusion
is based on the finding of the court in Executive Jet Aviation, the
reliance is misplaced. As already discussed in connection with
the income tax, there is nothing in that decision to indicate that
the interest owner should not be considered the owner of the
aircraft, for tax or any other purpose.
The proper characterization for sales tax purposes appears to
be that the fractional interest owner is the purchaser of an asset
which is held exclusively for resale. This means that, in most
States, the purchase of the interest would be exempt and tax
would be imposed on the lease payments.
The decision of the court in New York Times v. Comm'r provides
a helpful analogy.3 °5 In that case, the Board held that the lease
of an aircraft from a related company and the use of an unre-
lated company to provide management and pilot services were
two separate transactions - despite the taxpayer argument that
the two transactions should be combined. As a result, tax was
imposed on the lease payments.
304 Id.
305 New York Times v. Comm'r, Docket No. F214442 (Mass. App. Tax Bd. July
8, 1997), affd 693 N.E.2d 682 (Mass. 1998).
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C. CONSEQUENCES AND REMAINING ISSUES
1. Tax on the Purchase and Use of the Fractional Interest
The risk that sales tax will be imposed on the purchase of the
aircraft interest is generally eliminated by the practice of insur-
ing that the aircraft is delivered in a State which does not tax the
sale of aircraft. The risk that use tax will be imposed on the
aircraft interest is significantly reduced by a combination of the
resale exclusion and the Constitutional and State limitations on
taxation of nonresident aircraft.
The Constitutional and State limitations will not protect a
small fractional program which operates out of a single State.
Nevertheless, in most States, the resale exclusion should be
available to protect the aircraft interest from imposition of the
sales or use tax.
2. Tax on the Lease Payments
Ordinarily, where the resale exclusion applies, then sales tax
is imposed on the lease payments. In the case of a small frac-
tional program which operates out of a single State, sales tax can
be collected and paid to that State. However, in the case of a
multistate fractional program, there are several questions which
must be resolved:
First, what is the level of activity required to subject the lease
payment to tax? If Constitutional or State limitations would pre-
vent tax from being imposed on the whole aircraft, then, pre-
sumably, tax should not be imposed on the lease payments.
Some courts have expressed the sentiment that a nonresident
lessor is entitled to even greater protection." 6 On the other
hand, some States appear to have taken the position that deliv-
ery of the property to the lessee is enough to trigger liability for
sales tax on the lease payments." 7 Although the Supreme Court
appears to have approved of the use of this method, 0 s there
306 Marx v. Leasing Assoc., Inc., 520 So.2d 1333 (1987).
307 See, e.g., Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60 (1993).
However, because each flight is a separate "lease," the tax exposure is limited to
the tax on that flight.
308 Id. For some reason, Itel did not appeal the decision of the lower court that
this approach was permitted under Complete Auto Transit. Nevertheless, the courts
could have upheld imposition of the tax under the theory that the delivery to the
lessee was like a sale.
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may be State limitations on taxation of nonresident aircraft
which prevent imposition of the sales tax.30 9
Second, what is the tax basis? Unlike the federal transporta-
tion tax, which is imposed on the entire hourly cost, the sales
and use tax should only be imposed on the amount paid for the
aircraft and fuel and should not be imposed on the amount
paid for the pilots.
3. No Safe Harbors?
A cautious interest owner might be tempted to try to avoid
problems by paying tax in some State. For example, the owner
might decide to pay use tax to their home State based on the
purchase price of their interest. However, this may not be a
good idea. First, paying tax to one State does not prevent other
States from asserting their right to tax the aircraft. Although the
States are generally required to give credit for taxes paid to
other States, credit is not allowed where the tax was improperly
paid.3"' If the aircraft never enters the home State, then there is
no legal basis for paying the use tax. By the time the matter is
resolved, the statute of limitations for obtaining a refund of tax
from the wrong State may have passed. Second, even if the tax
was properly paid, the other States may not allow credit for all
taxes paid. For example, a State taxing the lease payments may
not allow a credit for tax paid on the use of the aircraft, since
the use and lease of the aircraft are two separate transactions.3 1
309 For example, if the delivery to the lessee is like a sale and the State has a
"fly-away" exemption, tax might not apply.
310 Article V of the Multistate Tax Compact, which has been adopted by most
States, requires that a credit be allowed only for "legally imposed sales or use
taxes." See, e.g., MINN. R. 8130.4400, subpart 2 (2001) ("A Minnesota taxpayer
who erroneously pays a sales tax to another state may not take a credit against the
tax due Minnesota on the Minnesota return. Credit is allowed against the tax
due Minnesota if the Minnesota taxpayer has legally paid a sales tax to another
state and may only be taken by the person who paid the tax to the other state.");
N.Y. TAx LAw § 1118(7) (McKinney 2002) (credit allowed "to the extent that a
retail sales or use tax was legally due and paid thereon").
311 See, e.g., Ryder Truck Rental v. Bryant, 170 So. 2d 822, 825 (Fla. 1964) (tax
can be imposed on both purchase and lease of same equipment, since purchase
and lease are two separate transactions.); Boise Bowling Ctr. v. State, 461 P.2d
262, 265 (Ida. 1969) ("There is no double taxation when two separate and dis-
tinct privileges are being taxed even though the subject matter to which each
separate transaction pertains may be identical.").
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Credit may not be allowed against local taxes.112 The credit
formula may not allow full recovery of the amount paid. 13
VI. STATE PROPERTY/REGISTRATION TAX
A. THE GENERAL RULES
In about one-third of the States, aircraft are subject to prop-
erty tax, which is an annual tax which is generally equal to a
percentage of aircraft value. 14 In another third of the States,
aircraft are subject to an annual registration tax, which is in lieu
of the property tax. 315 In the remaining one-third of the States,
aircraft are exempt from property tax or registration tax.
1. Property Tax
Generally, an aircraft operated under Part 91 is subject to
property tax entirely in the State where the aircraft is based. In
order for another State to impose an apportioned tax, the State
must be able to show that the aircraft has acquired a "situs" in
the State. Conversely, in order for the owner to avoid paying tax
on any portion of the aircraft, the owner must be able to estab-
lish that the aircraft has obtained a taxable situs in another
State. 16
The tax is generally imposed on the registered owner of the
property. However, the lessee of property may be taxed where
the transaction is determined to be a conditional sale of the
property. 17
Because airline property will generally have a taxable situs in
several States, the State property tax laws generally have a statu-
312 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 297A.80 (2001).
313 Some States allow a credit based on the ratio of the State rate to the rate in
the other State. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 297A.80 (2001). This formula does not
take into account the possibility that the tax in the other State, while at a lower
rate, was imposed on a higher taxable amount. This could happen where, for
example, the other State did not allow a trade-in credit.
314 Based on the author's experience, the tax amount is generally somewhere
between 1 to 3% of the fair market value of the aircraft.
315 Based on the author's experience, the tax amount is generally somewhere
between a few hundred dollars to 1% of the fair market value of the aircraft.
316 See, e.g., Peabody Coal Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 731 S.W.2d 837 (Mo.
1987).
317 See, e.g., Alban Tractor Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 150 A.2d 456 (Md. 1959);
Custom Leasing Co. v. Limbach, 577 N.E.2d 348 (Ohio 1991); City of Milwaukee
v. Shoup Voting Mach. Corp., 196 N.W.2d 694 (Wis. 1972).
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tory provision requiring apportionment of value. i Some States
have extended this requirement to charter aircraft. 319 A couple
of States allow apportionment for aircraft operated under Part
91.320 Where there is a fleet of aircraft, the States will often com-
pute apportioned value based on the activity of the entire fleet
(the "unit value method").321
2. Aircraft Registration Tax
The aircraft registration tax is generally imposed on the regis-
tered owner of the aircraft. The amount and computation of
the tax varies widely. In some States, the tax is based on value or
original CoSt. 322 In other States, the tax is based on number of
seats or engines or useful load.323
The treatment of residents and nonresidents is often signifi-
cantly different. Where an aircraft owned by a resident is lo-
cated in the State, the registration tax is generally imposed
regardless of how long the aircraft has been in the State. 4
318 See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 1152 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 308.505 (2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-5-1301 (2001); TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 21.05 (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-401 (2002); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 84.12.200 (West 2002).
319 See, e.g., NEV. ADMIN. CODE ch. 361, § 4685(2) (2001).
320 These States are Missouri and Texas. Missouri treats all aircraft over 7,000
lbs. as commercial aircraft. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 155.010(4) (West 2002). Texas
allows apportionment of value for business aircraft. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 21.055 (Vernon 2002).
32, The Supreme Court allowed the use of this method in Braniff Airways, Inc.
v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization and Assessment, 347 U.S. 590 (1954). The "unit
value" method appears to have been adopted in the late 1800s for the purpose of
valuing property of railroad companies. Debra M. Gabbard, Taxation of Public Ser-
vice Companies Providing Utility Service (Oct. 1998) ("Public service companies are
valued under the unit valuation rule. Unit valuation originated during the late
1800's when it was determined that it was impossible to accurately value the prop-
erty of a railroad by looking at individual lines of track, not to mention the loco-
motives and carlines which are a constantly moving target. The concept of
valuing the entire railroad and then apportioning some of that value to each
taxing district was put into place. Now 27 States use unit valuation to estimate the
value of large multicounty and multistate public service companies.").
322 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 28-8335 (1997) (taxable value is average fair mar-
ket value of particular make, model, and year of aircraft); MINN. STAT. § 360.531
(1999) (taxable value is list price reduced by a specified percentage per year of
ownership).
323 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 21-114 (Michie Supp. 2001) (useful load); IND. CODE
ANN. § 6-6-6.5-13 (Michie 2002) (age, class, and maximum landing weight).
324 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 6-6-6.5-2(a) (Michie 2002) ("any resident of this
state who owns an aircraft shall register the aircraft with the department not later
than thirty-one (31) days after the purchase date [and] any nonresident who
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However, where the aircraft is owned by a nonresident, the law
generally requires that the aircraft be used in the State for a
certain number of days before the tax applies.325
B. CHARACTERIZATION OF FRACTIONAL PROGRAMS
Generally, for property and registration tax purposes, the only
thing that matters is who owns the aircraft. While the State tax
authorities might want to argue that either the selling company
or the management company is the owner of all of the aircraft,
there does not appear to be a good basis for reaching this con-
clusion. Presumably, the interest owners will be considered the
joint owners of each aircraft.
C. CONSEQUENCES AND REMAINING ISSUES
As in the case of the sales and use tax, there are many unan-
swered questions. However, in this case, the likely answer is that
the aircraft will not be subject to tax.
1. Property Tax
In order for a State to impose property tax, the aircraft must
have a situs with the State. As noted previously, the States them-
selves have tended to require a fairly high level of activity to cre-
ate situs, in some cases holding that using property 33% of the
time in a particular State is not enough to create situs in that
State. 126 As a practical matter, a fractional aircraft used in a na-
tionwide fractional program will generally not spend enough
time in a particular State to create situs.
bases an aircraft in this state for more than sixty (60) days shall register the air-
craft with the department under this chapter not later than sixty (60) days after
establishing a base in Indiana"); OR. REv. STAT. § 837.040 (2001) ("every resident
owner of any civil aircraft, physically capable of operation or flight as determined
by the Director of the Oregon Department of Aviation, when such aircraft is lo-
cated in this state or before it is operated or flown over the lands or waters of this
state ...shall cause to be filed with the Oregon Department of Aviation, an
application for registration of the aircraft ...").
325 See, e.g., ARMa. REV. STAT. § 28-8336 (1997) (more than 90 days); IND. CODE
ANN. § 6-6-6.5-2 (West 2002) (60 days after establishing a base in Indiana); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 2:2 (West 2001) (more than 90 days).
326 See, e.g., Peabody Coal Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 731 S.W.2d 837 (Mo.
1987).
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2. Aircraft Registration Tax
The likelihood that an aircraft registration tax will be imposed
appears equally remote. The major States do not have a regis-
tration tax.12 1
VII. CONCLUSION
The tax treatment of fractional programs for transportation
tax and income tax purposes seems to be fairly well settled.
Where the fractional program primarily involves operations in a
single State, the State tax treatment will generally be settled by
reference to the laws of that State.
In the case of a multistate fractional program, the Constitu-
tional and State limitations and exclusions may work together to
prevent imposition of any State taxes. While this might seem to
give fractional programs an unfair advantage over other Part 91
aircraft, it should be recalled that Part 91 aircraft are not subject
to the transportation tax. Perhaps, in an unintended way, jus-
tice is being done.
327 California and Texas have a property tax. Florida, Illinois and New York
have no property tax or registration tax on aircraft.
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